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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
VIVIAN M. SCHELLER 
and STEVEN D. TOLLSTRUP, 
Plaintif f s-Appellants, 
vs 
DIXIE SIX CORPORATION, 
Def endant-Respondent, 
Petitioner. 
Supreme Court No. 880207 
STATEMENT OPPOSING DIXIE'S QUESTIONS 
PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Dixie's questions for review in its brief do not 
accurately state the case and do not present a situation 
in which a writ of certiorari should be issued. Rule 4 3 
of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court state the character 
of reasons that will be considered before granting a writ 
of certiorari. It is submitted that no such reasons are 
presented by Dixie. A copy of Rule H3 is included in the 
appendix hereto. 
I. Dixie's first question is founded principally 
on the argument that Scheller's remedy is contained in the 
contract provision for dissolution of the partnership. 
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That argument is contrary to the trial court's judgment 
which specifically states that the partnership "continues 
in force." A copy of the trial court's judgment, which 
was prepared by Dixie, is included in the appendix. There 
has never been an issue as to partnership dissolution. 
Because the partnership remains in existence, the Court 
of Appeals properly determined that the contract between 
Dixie and Scheller did not contemplate a situation where 
Dixie would sell the unimproved property, and because there 
was no applicable contract provision, the doctrine of quantum 
meruit should be applied to determine any division of profits 
after Dixie had already been reimbursed for its expenses 
and received a sales commission of six percent. The Court 
of Appeals stated at 8l Utah Adv. Rep. 27, 30 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988) that: 
. . . In this case, while the parties entered 
into a contract, no contract existed as to the 
allocation of proceeds in the event the property 
was sold undeveloped. . . . 
A copy of the opinion of the Court of Appeals is included 
in the appendix. 
It is submitted that Dixie's position in its first 
question does not accurately represent the facts or law, 
and there is no conflict with previous decisions of the 
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Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals which would justify 
issuing the writ under the circumstances of this case. 
II. Dixie's second question proposes that Scheller 
was estopped or had waived her right to object to the alloc-
ation of proceeds from the sale of the undeveloped property. 
Dixie does not cite any conflicting decision or other reason 
for issuance of the writ under Rule 43. 
III. Dixie's third question asks that this court 
review the Court of Appeals' interpretation of the meaning 
of the words "subdivide, develop and market" repeatedly 
used in the contract. Dixie cites no case in conflict with 
the Court of Appeals' right to interpret the meaning of 
the words in the contract as a matter of law in a situation 
where the trial court did not make any determination of 
fact concerning the intent of the parties as to those words 
at the time the contract was made. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Dixie and Scheller entered into a written contract 
in which several separate provisions required Dixie to "sub-
divide, develop and market" the property contributed by 
Scheller. Although those words were not defined in the 
contract, they were taken from Dixie's own agreement from 
a prior transaction. Dixie constructed no improvements 
on the property and sold the unimproved property to Busch. 
Dixie was reimbursed for all of its expenses plus a sales 
commission of six percent of the total sales price. The 
issue before the Court of Appeals was whether the trial 
court had properly determined that after payment of the 
expenses and commission Dixie should also share in the sale 
profits as though Dixie had constructed improvements on 
the property. The Court of Appeals held that the contract 
did not contemplate a situation where Dixie did not build 
improvements on the property and therefore the doctrine 
of quantum meruit should be applied. The Court of Appeals 
also held that Scheller could not be estopped to object 
to the division of proceeds even though Scheller had agreed 
to a sale because Dixie had the independent power to sell 
the property under the contract without Schellerfs permission. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
It is submitted that the following facts apply 
to the questions stated in Dixie's petition. 
1. The Dixie-Scheller contract does not define 
the words "subdivide, develop and market". A copy of the 
contract (Trial Exhibit 5) is included in the appendix. 
2. Those words or substantial equivalents thereof 
are used nine times throughout the contract. See Articles 
II, VI, IX, XIV and XV. 
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3. The w^^-'i? '"subdivide, H P V ^ I ^ : sr.n miv ret ' 
and the context ine - » • * - - *v-1 m 
from Dixie's own contract from a prior transaction which 
contract was used as a model for the Dixie-Schelle-"1 ron*r&~t. 
A copy of Dixie's contract (Trial Exhit :i t J! I) j s i 
in the appendix. 
^ . T) ie tr:i a 1 coI irt i i Iacie :i io determination oi the 
parties' frre't as to •.!-- vi^ai . nf * * : h^?° w^rd? »^ f^e 
time the contract was made. See Findings el Yhr:X &^-i Conclusions 
5. Under the contract Dixie had • h- power to 
sell the property and also had the obligation to obtain 
financing and to i ^ UJIvide , (J«.- vt- J oj> H i nmik^t"" thf property. 
F( r examplej :r regard to Dixie's obligation, ArticI e XIV 
•' ". ".^ -^  • r ' • r rig sentence which was taken verbatim 
from paragraph [\ of 1)1 xie's prior contract: 
It j s understood by the parties that the 
property shall be utilized by the partnership 
to obtain a loan, the proceeds thereof to be used 
for the subdivision, development and marketing 
~
4
 ^
Ke property by Dixie, 
Shortly after the contract was signed in 1980 
and t h e n a g a i n id tin l , i l l ul I oft? Mi>ie h - ••• - r^— )ved 
property appraised. Both appraisals showea suL-stantiai .- v 
the same value. (Trial Exhibits 8 and 3^; also see R. 212-13)-
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7. Dixie told Scheller in early 1983 that in 
addition to reimbursement for expenses and receiving a six 
percent sales commission, Dixie was also entitled to fifty 
percent of the profit on any sale whether or not the property 
was sold without development thereon. (Trial Exhibit 14; 
R. 294-95). 
8. Also in early 1983 and prior to the sale of 
the unimproved property to Busch, Scheller objected orally 
and in writing to the proposed allocation to Dixie of any 
expected sales proceeds above the reimbursement and commission. 
(Trial Exhibit 15; R. 295-96). 
9. Thereafter, on June 30, 1983 Dixie sold the 
unimproved property to Busch. (Trial Exhibit 16). 
10. Although Dixie now argues that Scheller is 
limited to remedies for dissolution or breach of contract, 
the trial court's judgment (prepared by Dixie) specifically 
states that the partnership between Dixie and Scheller continues. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. WHERE THE CONTRACT GAVE DIXIE THE 
SEPARATE POWER TO SELL THE PROPERTY UNDEVELOPED 
WHICH POWER DIXIE CHOSE TO EXERCISE IN SPITE OF 
DIXIE'S SEPARATE CONTRACT OBLIGATION TO SUBDIVIDE, 
DEVELOP AND MARKET THE PROPERTY, THE CONTRACT 
DID NOT CONTEMPLATE THE OCCURRENCE OP SUCH A 
SITUATION AND THE COURT OF APPEALS PROPERLY APPLIED 
QUANTUM MERUIT. 
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There was never an issue as to dissolution or 
that Dixie breached the contract by exercising its power 
to sell the undeveloped property. Neither the trial court's 
nor the Court of Appeals1 decision mentions any issue of 
dissolution or breach. For the first time Dixie now argues 
that Scheller is limited to specific remedies for 
dissolution or breach of contract which arguments are contrary 
to the trial court's judgment that "the limited partnership 
between the parties continues in force under its specific 
terms." 
The problem occurs since Dixie had the separate 
contract obligation to build on the property the fulfillment 
of which obligation was in substance a condition precedent 
which needed to be performed before Dixie could share in 
profits of sale. Because Dixie chose not to build on the 
property but to sell it unimproved, Dixie was not entitled 
to share in the so-called profits as though Dixie had built 
on the property. The Court of Appeals correctly interpreted 
the contract to provide first for reimbursement of expenses 
and payment of the commission to Dixie and then for a division 
of profits only if Dixie performed its contract obligation 
to subdivide, develop and market. The court held that there 
was no provision in the contract providing for such allocation 
of profits to Dixie if Dixie sold the property unimproved. 
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Thus, there was no written contract covering that circum-
stance, and the application of quantum meruit was proper. 
None of the cases relied on by Dixie dealt with 
the situation present in this case. In Mann v. American 
Western Life Insurance Co., 586 P.2d 46l (Utah 1978), the 
issue was whether there was an oral modification of a 
written contract and not whether the written contract did 
not contemplate a particular situation which later occurred. 
In Jaye Smith Construction Co. v. Board of Education, 
Granite School District, 560 P.2d 320 (UT 1977), the issue 
was whether a separate letter was a limiting condition to 
an unequivocal construction bid and not whether the bid 
did not contemplate a later circumstance that was unanticipated. 
In Rio Algom Corp. v. Jimco, Ltd., 6l8 P.2d 497 (UT 1980), 
the contract specifically covered the fact situation therein 
and did not deal with an eventuality not anticipated or 
covered by the contract such as is present in this case. 
Dixie implies that the Court of Appeals1 holding 
in this case is contrary to the prior Court of Appeals1 
decision in Davies v. Olson, 70 Utah Adv. Rep. 42, 746 P.2d 
264 (UT Ct. App. 1987). The same panel of the Court of 
Appeals which decided the Davies case decided this case 
only five months later and cited the Davies opinion. In 
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Davies the panel discussed the doctrine of quantum meruit 
at length but did not restrict its application to a situation 
where a written contract exists but is silent as to an un-
contemplated circumstance which occurs thereafter. In this 
case the parties obviously anticipated that subdividing, 
developing and marketing was a condition precedent to the 
payment to Dixie of fifty percent of the profits. Thus, 
there was no contemplation that Dixie would claim that profit 
without improving the property and there was no written 
provision applying to such a circumstance. The Court of 
Appeals correctly applied quantum meruit to that situation 
where the contract did not expressly cover the uncontemplated 
circumstance that later occurred. 
POINT II. BECAUSE DIXIE HAD THE RIGHT TO SELL 
THE PROPERTY, NEITHER SCHELLERTS CONSENT NOR LACK 
OF OBJECTION TO A SALE CAN BE THE BASIS FOR ESTOPPEL. 
Dixie's argument is based on several assertions 
which are demonstrably wrong. First of all, Scheller objected 
to Dixie's proposed allocation of profits both orally and 
in writing before the sale to Busch. Secondly, Scheller 
has never pleaded or argued that Dixie breached the contract. 
Schellerfs consistent position has been that the contract 
provided that Dixie was entitled to be reimbursed for its 
expenses plus a commission but the contract did not provide 
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that Dixie was entitled to take an additional fifty percent 
if Dixie did not go forward and subdivide, develop and market 
the property. 
POINT III. THE COURT OF APPEALS PROPERLY HELD 
THAT THE TRIAL COURT WRONGLY DECIDED THE CASE ON THE 
BASIS OF ESTOPPEL AND THEN FAILED TO GO FURTHER AND 
DEFINE THE PIVOTAL WORDS "SUBDIVIDE, DEVELOP AND 
MARKET." 
Contrary to the assertion in Dixie's third point 
that the Court of Appeals wrongly substituted its judgment 
on the facts for that of the trial court's, the trial court 
never defined the words "subdivide, develop and market" 
in its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment 
and never determined the parties1 intention as to the meaning 
of those words at the time the contract was executed. It 
is clear that the words "subdivide, develop and market" 
come from Dixie's prior agreement and should have been 
construed against Dixie. Dixie again asserts in its third 
point that Scheller's remedy is one for breach. That assertion 
has no merit as Dixie well knows because the partnership 
was specifically held by the trial court to continue in 
existence. 
CONCLUSION 
Dixie does not present a reason under Rule 43 
that justifies granting a writ of certiorari. There was 
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never an issue as to remedies for breach of contract or 
dissolution, and the trial court specifically held that 
the partnership continued. The contract did not contemplate 
a situation where Dixie would sell the property undeveloped 
and then also share in the profit even though Dixie had 
not fulfilled its obligation to subdivide, develop and market 
the property. The Court of Appeals properly applied quantum 
meruit where the contract did not contain a remedy for that 
circumstance. DixieTs petition should be denied. 
DATED this IjJth day of June, 1988. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailedf our copies of the fore-
going to CRAIG G. ADAMSON and MARK A. LARSEN, attorneys for 
petitioner, 310 South Main, Suite 1330, Salt Lake City, 
UT 84101, postage prepaid, this l#th day of June, 1988. 
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IN THE 
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Vivian M. SCHELLER and Steven D. 
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Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
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Six Corporation 
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Walter P. Faber, Jr. for Appellants. 
I Craig G. Adamson, Mark A. Larsen, 
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J OPINION 
ORME, Jadge: 
Appellants Scheller and Tollstnip appeal 
from a judgment awarding defendant Dixie 
Six Corporation what they contend is an exc-
essive distribution pursuant to a limited part-
nership agreement between the parties. We 
reverse in part and remand. 
Facts 
Vivian Scheller and her son Steven Tollstnip 
("Scheller*), owned approximately twenty-
four acres of property in Salt Lake County 
which they intended to have developed to 
produce long-term income. In the spring of 
1979, Mrs. Scheller approached Hal Larsen, 
an officer of Dixie Six Corporation, about 
working with her and her son to develop the 
property. On March 3, 1980, the parties 
formed a limited partnership known as 
D.S.T., Ltd., with Dixie Six as the general 
partner and Mrs. Scheller and her son as 
limited partners. Pursuant to the limited par-
tnership agreement, Dixie Six contributed 
SI0,000 toward the initial capital and Scheller 
conveyed the property to D.S.T. 
The partnership agreement provided that the 
purpose of the partnership was to "subdivide, 
develop and market" the property. The words 
•subdivide, develop and market" were left 
undefined. The agreement contained a formula 
for the allocation of the partnership's receipts, 
which may be summarized as follows: 
(a) First, to reimburse the actual 
expenses relative to the subdividing, 
development, improvement and tale 
of the property, 
(b) Second, to payment to the 
Limited Partners for the real pro-
perty, calculated at $30,000 per 
acre. 
(c) Third, one-half of the remai-
nder to Dixie Six and one-half of 
the remainder to the Limited Part-
ners. 
In addition, the agreement provided that Dixie 
Six could charge the partnership a real estate 
commission not exceeding &k of the sales 
price of the property and, further, that Dixie 
Six had the unqualified right to sell the prop-
erty at any time. 
Following the signing of the agreement, 
Dixie Six hired Western Design, which began 
preparing plans, plats, and studies, and sought 
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS 
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governmental approval to build an apartment 
and commercial complex on the site. 
In April 1981, D.S.T. sold 1.2 acres of the 
property to Marvin Hendrickson, an officer 
and shareholder in Dixie Six, for $36,000.00 
and in February 1982, D.S.T. sold an additi-
onal 0.75 acres to Hendrickson. In both tra-
nsactions, D.S.T. took no sales commission or 
other distribution and paid all of the proceeds 
toScheller. 
Once the plans for improvement on the site 
were completed in the fall of 1982, Dixie Six 
attempted to get financing for the project but 
was unsuccessful.1 During this time, D.S.T. 
received an offer from P.F. West to purchase 
the remaining property. Dixie Six sought 
Scheller's consent to the proposed sale to P.F. 
West and Scheller consented, but the sale was 
never completed. Dixie Six subsequently disc-
ontinued its efforts to locate and obtain fina-
ncing. Dixie Six then caused the remaining 
partnership property to be sold to Busch 
Development on June 30, 1983, for a sum in 
excess of SI .2 million. 
Prior to the sale of the property, Dixie Six 
informed Scheller that it intended to divide the 
proceeds from the sale according to the 
formula set forth in the partnership agree-
ment.2 Scheller objected to allocation of the 
proceeds on that basis. The sale was concluded 
without the allocation issue having been res-
olved. On September 23, 1983 Scheller filed 
suit in district court seeking a declaratory 
judgment limiting Dixie Six to the recovery of 
its expenses plus the 6% sales commission for 
the sale of the property and to prohibit Dixie 
Six from sharing in the profit of the sale as set 
forth in the partnership agreement. 
The trial court found that the partnership 
agreement did not define the* words 
'subdivide, develop, and market" and concl-
uded that Dixie Six did not violate the agree-
ment by selling the property. The court also 
concluded that Scheller was estopped from 
claiming that Dixie Six had not performed in 
accordance with the contract because Scheller 
had knowledge of, and in fact acquiesced and 
approved of, all sales of the property. In 
addition, the court found that it would be 
inequitable to allow Scheller to accept the 
efforts of Dixie Six without allowing Dixie Six 
to recover as provided in the contract. Since 
the parties had expressly provided no altern-
ative method of compensating Dixie Six for its 
services, the court found the formula as set 
forth in the partnership agreement to be enf-
orceable. 
Scheller argues that Dixie Six was not enti-
tled to a full share of the profits from the sale 
of the property because It sold the property 
without •developing" it as required by the 
agreement. Scheller acknowledges that, while 
Dixie Six had the unqualified right to sell the 
property at any time, a right Scheller contends 
was given primarily for tax purposes, it had 
Six Corporation cooe^ co 
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the obligation to 'subdivide, develop and 
market" the property. Thus, Dixie Six's right 
to share in the proceeds according to the 
formula set forth in the agreement was conti-
ngent upon its fulfilling its obligation to 
"subdivide, develop and market" the property. 
The trial court did not reach the issue of the 
meaning of the term "develop" as used in the 
agreement because it determined that Scheller 
was "estopped" from taking the position that 
Dixie Six had not performed as provided in 
the contract. We find Scheller's conduct does 
not constitute estoppel. 
Estoppel 
The elements of estoppel are: 'conduct by 
one party which leads another party, in reli-
ance thereon, to adopt a course of action 
resulting in detriment or damage if the first 
party is permitted to repudiate his conduct." 
Barnes v. Wood, 75 Utah Adv. Rep. 62, 64 
(Ct. Xpp. 1988) (quoting Blackhurst v. Trail-
samerica IDS. CO., 699 P.2d 688, 691 (Utah 
1985)). The trial court concluded that appell-
ants were estopped from asserting that Dixie 
Six could not sell the property unless it was 
"developed" because Scheller had knowledge 
of, acquiesced in, and approved of the two 
minor sales of property to Marvin Hendric-
kson and the proposed sale to P.F. West, all 
without any development having taken place. 
However, the trial court's conclusion confuses 
Scheller's position concerning sale of the 
property with Scheller's position concerning 
the allocation of proceeds upon sale. 
Scheller has not asserted that Dixie Six 
could not sell the property unless it was 
"developed * as anticipated under the agree-
ment but only that Dixie Six was not entitled 
to a full share of the proceeds for the sale of 
property unless it satisfied its obligations 
under the contract. Scheller's approval of the 
first two sales of property do not constitute an 
estoppel from objecting to the allocation of 
proceeds from the Busch sale for two reasons. 
First, the earlier sales of property, combined, 
constituted only 1.95 acres out of the total 24 
acres owned by D.S.T. and involved land that 
was never intended for development. Second, 
Dixie Six took no sales commissions on these 
transactions and paid all the proceeds to 
Scheller. Therefore, Scheller had no reason to 
complain about the allocation of proceeds. 
Nor can Scheller's approval of the proposed 
P.F. West sale form the basis of an estoppel 
from objecting to the allocation of proceeds 
from the Busch sale. The P.F. West sale was 
never completed and there were no proceeds to 
allocate. Thus, Scheller's failure to object to 
the allocation of proceeds from two sales in 
which Dixie Six took no proceeds and one 
proposed sale which never reached the point 
of allocation, is not conduct that could reas-
onably lead Dixie Six to believe that Scheller 
J would not object to its claiming a full share of 
REPORTS UTAH ADVAN 
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proceeds in the event of a consummated sale 
of undeveloped property. Any uncertainty in 
this regard was resolved when, nearly two 
months prior to closing of the Busch sale, 
Scheiler's counsel wrote Dixie Six objecting to 
use of the agreement's formula for allocating 
sale proceeds if the property were sold unde-
veloped. 
We hold that the trial court erred in concl-
uding that Scheller was estopped by its own 
actions from asserting that Dixie Six did not 
perform as provided in the contract. Because 
the trial court decided the case on a theory of 
estoppel, it was not necessary for it to reach 
what we view as the pivotal issue in this case, 
namely the meaning of the term 'develop9 as 
used in the agreement. Since we find that 
Scheller's conduct did not give rise to an est-
oppel, the exact meaning of the term is crit-
ical. 
'Subdivide, Develop and Market* 
Generally, the term "develop/ when used in 
connection with real estate, is interpreted to 
mean "the converting of a tract of land into 
an area suitable for residential or business 
uses/ Prince George's County v. Equitable 
Trust Co., Inc., 44 Md. App. 272, 408 A.2d 
737, 742 (1979). Accord, Muirhead v. PUot 
Properties, Inc., 258 So.2d 232, 233 (Miss. 
1972). Similarly, the word "developer," in 
common parlance, means "a person who 
develops real estate; often: one that improves 
and subdivides land and builds and sells resi-
dential structures thereon/ Webster's Third 
New International Dictionary 618 (1986). 
The parties' agreement states in Article II 
that the purpose of the partnership is to 
"subdivide, develop, and market" the prop-
erty. The use of these terms, or some varia-
tion, throughout the agreement, is consistent 
with the interpretation that "develop" means 
to build. For example, Article VI, with our 
emphasis, states as follows: 
In addition thereto, Dixie shall 
contribute its expertise for the 
purpose of subdividing, developing 
and marketing the property; shall 
provide or obtain all equipment, 
machinery and personnel necessary 
for such subdivision, development 
and marketing; and shall obtain the 
necessary and sufficient financing 
tot such subdivision, development 
and marketing, using the property 
as security thereof. 
Viewing the contract as a whole, we would 
have little difficulty in concluding, as a matter 
of law, that the term "develop" as used in this 
agreement means "build/3 Equipment, mac-
hinery, and secured lending suggest construc-
tion, not the mere planning, surveying, stud-
ying, and appraising which Dixie Six contends 
satisfied the obligation to "develop" the pro-
perty. However, even if there is some ambig-
uity concerning what the parties intended 
when using the term "develop," the evidence 
compels the conclusion that the parties inte-
nded to mean "build." The formula allocating 
a full 50* of the net proceeds to Dixie Six is 
itself indicative of that result. If all Scheller 
•anticipated was the sale of the property, it 
would have hired a real estate agent and paid 
the standard real estate commission. Common 
sense dictates that one does not offer someone 
half of the net profit on the sale of property 
for simply serving as an agent to sell property. 
More importantly, the prior discussions and 
negotiations between the parties and their 
course of conduct assumed actual building on 
the property. The trial court found that Dixie 
Six sought government approval for "the 
building of an apartment and commercial 
complex on the site." The court also found 
that prior to forming the partnership, the 
parties met on the site of the property and 
"discussed possible types and configurations of 
buildings which might fit on the land." 
The parties' agreement contemplated the 
development of the property and did not 
anticipate the sale of the property undevel-
oped. Accordingly, the payment formula was 
premised on the sale of developed property. 
So certain were the parties that the property 
would be developed that they never contemp-
lated a formula for the allocation of proceeds 
in the event of a sale of undeveloped property. 
Thus, there was simply no agreement between 
the parties as to the allocation of proceeds in 
the event that Dixie Six failed to develop the 
property as required by the agreement. 
Absent a meeting of the minds on how to 
divide the proceeds in the event of sale 
without development, Dixie Six has no clear 
contractual right to recover anything in excess 
of the agreed commission and expense reim-
bursement. Nonetheless, Scheller concedes that 
Dixie Six may be entitled to some sort of 
equitable remedy. 
Quantum Meruit 
The trial court, considering it had no alter-
native method of compensation, determined it 
had to either award Dixie Six no additional 
compensation whatsoever or a full 50* of the 
profit from the sale of the property. It chose 
the latter rather than leave Dixie Six uncom-
pensated for its efforts. While we agree with 
the trial court that it would be unfair to allow 
Scheller to profit from the work done by Dixie 
Six in anticipation of development, we do not 
agree that the only alternative is to give Dixie 
Six a 50% share of the net proceeds from the 
sale. 
When a party, for some reason, is not ent-
itled by the express terms of a contract to 
recover payment for services rendered, he or 
she might nonetheless be entitled to recover in 
quantum meruit. DaWes v. Olson, 746 P.2d 
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264, 268 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). Recovery 
under quantum meruit presupposes that no 
enforceable contract exists. Id. In this case, 
while the parties entered into a contract, no 
contract existed as to the allocation of proc-
eeds in the event the property was told unde-
veloped. 
Quantum meruit has two distinct branches, 
both rooted in justice to prevent one party's 
enrichment at the other's expense. Id. at 269. 
The first branch, contract implied in law or 
'quasi-contract/ is really not a contract at 
all, but rather an action in restitution. Id. 
'The dements of a quasi-contract, or a 
contract implied in law are: (1) the defendant 
received a benefit; (2) an appreciation or 
knowledge by the defendant of the benefit; (3) 
under circumstances that would make it unjust 
for the defendant to retain the benefit without 
paying for i t / Id. Recovery under quasi-
contract or contract implied in law is meas-
ured by the value of the benefit conferred on 
the defendant and not by the detriment incu-
rred by the plaintiff or, necessarily, the reas-
onable value of the plaintiffs services. Id. 
The second branch of quantum meruit, 
contract implied in fact, is an actual contract 
esublished by conduct. Id. The elemenu of a 
contract implied in fact are: (1) the defendant 
requested the plaintiff to perform the work; 
(2) the plaintiff expected the defendant to 
compensate him or her for those services; and 
(3) the defendant knew or should have known 
that the plaintiff expected compensation. Id. 
Recovery in such cases is for the amount the 
parties can be said to have reasonably inte-
nded as the contract price. When the parties 
have left that amount unexpressed, courts will 
infer the amount to be the reasonable value of 
the plaintiffs services. Id. 
The conduct of the parties in this case est-
ablished a contract implied in fact as to the 
allocation of proceeds if the property was told 
prior to development. Scheller requested Dixie 
Six to perform the work of developing the 
property which necessarily involved the work 
of preparing plans, plats, and studies and 
securing governmental approval for construc-
tion on the site. Likewise, Dixie Six dearly 
expected to be compensated for these services. 
Finally, Scheller knew or should have known 
that Dixie Six expected compensation for these 
services beyond the 6tt sales commission it 
would recrive for just selling the property. 
It is reasonably dear that, in agreeing to the 
payment formula prescribed in the agreement, 
the parties contemplated that Dixie Six's 6V§ 
commission, a standard commission rate in the 
real estate industry, would compensate it for 
its efforts in marketing the property while the 
5 0 * share in the net profits would reward it 
for its efforts in subdividing and developing 
the property. Thus, if there had been a mere 
tale, 6 * of the selling price would represent 
an appropriate allocation to Dixie Six. 
However, while it cannot be said that Dixie 
Six satisfied its obligation to develop the 
property, the trial court nonetheless found 
that Dixie Six had expended efforts which 
enhanced the property, induding acquiring 
plans for development of the property and 
obtaining governmental approval for develo-
pment in accordance with the plans. As expl-
ained above, Dixie Six is entitled to a recovery 
in quantum meruit for the reasonable value of 
its non-sale efforts. 
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment 
insofar as it awards Dixie Six the reimburse-
ment of its expenses and a sale commission of 
6 * . The judgment is reversed insofar as it 
also allowed Dixie Six 5 0 * of the net sale 
profits, with remand for a determination of 
the amount of additional compensation to 
which Dixie Six is entitled under a theory of 
quantum meruit. The parties shall bear their 
own costs of appeal. 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
Regnal W. Garff, Judge 
1. Articles IV and XIV of the agreement required 
Dixie Six, as one of its obligations, to obtain fina-
ncing. 
2. In their complaint, Scheller also claimed that 
Dixie Six had demanded a commission of 19tt 
rather than the 6 * provided in the agreement. 
5. Assuming that 'develop* means 'build/ uncert-
ainty remains as to what was to be built: a church, a 
race track, homes, a laundromat, or even roadways, 
curbs, and gutters? Such uncertainty is inconseque-
ntial in adjudicating the parties' rights where 
nothing whatever was built. 
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Ron DA VIES and Dan Mehr, dba 
Davies & Mehr Construction, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
v. 
Timothy R. OLSON, William S. Lund, 
Wasatch Bank, Utah Valley Bank, and 
Household Finance Corporation, De-
fendants and Appellants. 
Ron DAVIES and Dan Mehr, dba 
Davies & Mehr Construction, 
PlainttfTs and Appellants, 
v. 
Timothy R OLSON, William S. Lund, 
Wasatch Bank, Utah Valley Bank, and 
Household Finance Corporation, De-
fendants and Respondents. 
Not. 86014S-CA, 860146-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Nov. 24, 1987. 
Construction company brought action 
against owners seeking recovery for servic-
es in constructing duplexes. The Fourth 
District Court, Utah County, Robert J. 
Bullock, J., found in favor of construction 
company, and both parties appealed. The 
Court of Appeals, Billings, J., held that (1) 
there was no enforceable written or oral 
contract absent meeting of minds as to 
contract price; (2) owners were not denied 
due process due to fact that judgment was 
based on quantum meruit, theory which 
was not pled; and (3) statutory interest 
was calculable from date on which owner 
signed settlement statement used for clos-
ing on financing. 
Affirmed in part, reversed in part and 
remanded. 
1. Contracts *»28(3) 
Finding that there was no enforceable 
written or oral contract between owner and 
contractor was supported by evidence that 
parties did not agree on contract price and 
that contractor never signed proposed con-
tract 
2. Accord and Satisfaction *»4 
Settlement statement fixing sale under 
construction contract which was used for 
closing on financing did not constitute "ex-
ecutory accord," because there was no 
meeting of the minds. 
3. Trial *»6(1) 
Hearing in civil action must be pref-
aced by timely notice which adequately in-
forms parties of specific issues they must 
be prepared to meet 
4. Pleading *»427 
Issues not expressly raised in plead-
ings may be tried by implied consent of 
parties. 
5. Constitutional Law *»310 
Proof of quasi-contract under allega-
tion of breach of express contract does not 
violate due process, absent surprise or prej-
udice. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 14. 
6. Constitutional Law «=*310 
Pleading *»427 
Defendants in breach of contract ac-
tion were not denied due process due to 
trial court's award of damages based on 
unpled theory of quantum meruit, where 
supplemental hearing focused on plans and 
specifications underlying cost breakdown 
under construction contract, and on addi-
tional costs plaintiffs incurred because of 
defendant's requested changes in specifica-
tions. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 14. 
7. Appeal and Error *»1H8(6) 
In contractor's action to recover for 
costs incurred in constructing duplexes, 
judgment which awarded contractor dam-
ages based on theory of quantum meruit, 
but which gave owner credit for prior judg-
ment based on initial cost breakdown was 
inconsistent, and required remand for de-
termination of damages under quantum 
meruit 
8. Implied and Constructive Contracts 
Recovery under quantum meruit pre-
supposes that no enforceable written or 
oral contract exists. 
DA VIES v. 
Cite • • 746 FJd J64 
9. Implied and Constructive Contracts 
Elements of "quasi-contract," or con-
tract implied in law, are: defendant re-
ceived benefit; appreciation or knowledge 
by defendant of benefit; under circum-
stances that would make it unjust for de-
fendant to retain benefit without paying 
for it 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
10. Implied and Constructive Contracts 
«=*110 
Measure of recovery under quasi-con-
tract, or contract implied in law, is value of 
benefit conferred on defendant, and not 
detriment incurred by plaintiff, or neces-
sarily reasonable value of plaintiffs servic-
es. 
11. Contracts «»27 
Elements of "contract implied in fact" 
are: defendant requested plaintiff to per-
form work; plaintiff expected defendant to 
compensate him or her for those services; 
and defendant knew or should have known 
that plaintiff expected compensation. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
12. Interest e»37(l) 
Statutory legal rate of interest is ap-
plied from date payment is due to judg-
ment date. U.C.A. 1953, 16-1-1. 
13. Interest *»39(2.30) 
Day on which settlement statement 
was signed which was used at closing on 
financing for construction project was day 
that owner acknowledged obligation to pay 
contractor for services in constructing du-
plexes, and determination of interest due 
thus began on that date. U.C.A. 1953, 
15-1- 1. 
Dallas H. Young, Jr., Jerry L Reynolds, 
Provo, for defendants and appellants. 
Gary D. Stott, Lynn S. Davies, Salt Lake 
City, for defendants and respondents. 
1. The first trial was held on August 2, 19S2 and 
September 13, 1982. The supplemental hearing 
was held on April 4, 1985, April 10, 1985, and 
OLSON 
(UuhApp. I9S7) 
Before GARFF, ORME and 
BILLINGS, JJ. 
BILLINGS, Judge: 
Utah 265 
Both parties appeal from the trial court's 
May 17, 1985 judgment against defendant 
Olson, purporting to award plaintiffs their 
reasonable costs (plus interest) incurred in 
constructing four duplexes for defendants. 
We affirm the trial court's finding that 
there was no contract, and the court's con-
clusion that quantum meruit was, there-
fore, the proper theory of recovery. We, 
however, reverse the finding of no liability 
on the part of defendant Lund. We re-
mand for findings as to whether he (1) 
requested plaintiffs to perform work and if 
so, to what extent, and/or (2) received any 
benefits as a result of plaintiffs' construc-
tion of the duplexes, and an entry of a 
judgment consistent with those findings 
and our opinion. We further reverse the 
trial court's calculation of damages against 
defendant Olson and remand for a determi-
nation of the reasonable value of plaintiffs' 
services in constructing the duplexes, and 
an entry of a judgment in that amount 
against defendant Olson. 
FACTS 
The following facts were developed in a 
bifurcated trial held on five nonconsecutive 
days over a two-year eight-month period.1 
Plaintiff Davies and defendant Olson orally 
agreed that Davies would construct four 
duplexes for Olson. The parties originally 
agreed that plaintiff Davies would con-
struct the duplexes for "cost plus $6,000 
builder's profit per duplex.9' Based on this 
oral agreement, plaintiff Davies prepared a 
cost breakdown and submitted it to Was-
atch Bank for acquisition of long-term fi-
nancing, and to defendant Olson. Subse-
quently, defendant Olson requested numer-
ous changes and additions to the original 
specifications for the duplexes. 
Soon thereafter, defendants, in an at-
tempt to establish a ceiling price on the 
April 16, 1985. The confusion and inconsisten-
cies in the judgment are largely attributable to 
the unfortunate interruptions in the trial. 
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cost of construction at $72,070 per duplex, 
prepared a contract and submitted it to 
plaintiffs. In his letter to plaintiffs, de-
fendant Olson stated that the purpose of 
the proposed contract was "mainly to satis-
fy [defendant] Lund" as he was concerned 
about fixing a ceiling price. This contract, 
however, was never executed. 
A settlement statement, dated July 7, 
1981 and signed by defendant Lund, fixed 
the contract sales price at $128,500. This 
settlement statement was used at the clos-
ing with Wasatch Bank. Wasatch Bank 
provided permanent financing, which was 
insufficient to cover plaintiffs' construction 
expenses. Consequently, plaintiffs initi-
ated an action against, among others, de-
fendants Olson and Lund, alleging claims 
of fraud, breach of contract, and fore-
closure of mechanics' liens. (The fore-
closure claim was resolved). 
After the initial trial on August 2, 1982 
and September 13, 1982, the trial court 
entered judgment on August 4, 1983 
against defendants Lund and Olson for 
$23,741.54f plus 12% interest accruing 
from July 7, 1981. The court found there 
was no agreement among the parties as to 
the total price to be paid for the construc-
tion of the duplexes. The court, however, 
based on the initial cost breakdown pre-
pared by plaintiff Davies, found defendants 
jointly liable for $23,741.54. The court 
then found that plaintiffs were additionally 
entitled to recover from defendant Olson 
the reasonable costs incurred because of 
defendant Olson's requested changes in the 
duplex specifications.1 The court then di-
rected counsel to negotiate and submit a 
figure as to the reasonable costs plaintiffs 
incurred because of defendant Olson's re-
quested changes. The parties failed to 
reach an agreement Consequently, a sup-
plemental hearing was held on April 4, 
1985, April 10, 1985, and April 16, 1985, 
2. The court found the cost per duplex to be 
$78,395. Multiplying that figure by the number 
of duplexes built (4), and subtracting the con-
struction costs paid by defendants, $289,838.46, 
yielded s judgment in the amount of $23,741.54. 
3. The court did not enter Judgment against de-
fendant Lund for this additional recovery, find-
focusing on the following issues previously 
reserved by the trial court 
1. What were the plans and specifica-
tions upon which plaintiffs and de-
fendants relied in the cost break-
down? 
2. What modifications were subsequent-
ly made to those plans and specifica-
tions upon defendant Olson's re-
quests? 
3. What were the reasonable costs of 
the requested modifications which 
were actually made by plaintiffs? 
The trial court, in its final judgment of 
May 17, 1985, found there was no meeting 
of the minds between the parties "as to 
plans and specifications which formed the 
basis of the cost breakdown," and, there-
fore, that it erred in basing its August 4, 
1983 judgment on that document The 
court concluded that in order to prevent 
unjust enrichment of defendant Olson, 
plaintiffs were entitled to recover their rea-
sonable costs of construction from him. 
The court, however, was silent as to de-
fendant Lund's liability. The court award-
ed plaintiffs $51,773.96 plus interest "at 
the legal rate of interest," accruing from 
July 7,1981, the date the settlement state-
ment was executed. The trial court calcu-
lated the May 17, 1985 judgment as fol-
lows: 
Reasonable eoet of construction $866,708.96 
Lett adjustment for water roetert 1,850.00 
NET CONSTRUCTION COST 866,868.96 
Lett the Amount of the August 4 
Judgment 4 818.6S0.00 
Mty 17, 1986 Judgment to Plsintiffi $61,778.96 
Both parties appeal from the Hay 17,1985 
judgment 
I. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE 
[1] On appeal, we are asked to deter 
mine whether there is sufficient evidence 
to support the trial court's finding of no 
enforceable written or oral contract The 
ing that defendant Lund merely assisted defend-
ant Olson in acquiring long-term financing. 
4. The court credited defendant Olson with pay-
ment of $78,395 per duplex, multiplied by the 
number of duplexes built (4), or $313,580. Sit 
Note 2, supra. 
DAVIES 
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trial court's findings of fact will not be set 
aside unless "clearly erroneous." Utah 
R.O.P. 62(a); State v. Wright, 744 P.2d 
815 (Utah CtApp.1987); State v. Walker, 
748 P.2d 191,193 (Utah 1987). A review of 
the record amply supports the trial court's 
findings (1) that there was no meeting of 
the minds as to the contract price, an es-
sential term of a construction contract; (2) 
that there was no meeting of the minds as 
to which plans and specifications formed 
the basis of the cost breakdown prepared 
by plaintiff Davies; and (3) that the parties 
did not intend the settlement statement to 
constitute an executory accord. 
Testimony at trial conflicted significantly 
as to the contract price. Plaintiff Davies 
testified that he and defendant Olson orally 
agreed that plaintiff Davies would con-
struct the four duplexes for cost plus 
$6,000 builder's profit per duplex. Defend-
ant Olson, on the other hand, while con-
ceding that cost plus $6,000 was discussed, 
denied that he agreed to an open-ended 
deal. Subsequent to the oral conversation 
between plaintiff Davies and defendant Ol-
son, plaintiff Davies prepared a cost break-
down and submitted it to Wasatch Bank 
and to defendant Olson. Thereafter, de-
fendant Olson prepared a written contract 
with a provision that cost was not to ex-
ceed $72,070 per duplex, evidently attempt-
ing to appease defendant Lund's concern 
about cost Defendant Olson presented 
this proposed contract to plaintiff Davies, 
claiming Davies said that he would sign it 
This contract, however, was never exe-
cuted. 
Given the disparity in the testimony re-
garding the contract price, the trial court's 
finding that there was no meeting of the 
minds as to the contract price is not clearly 
erroneous. 
[2] We also affirm the trial court's find-
ing that the settlement statement used for 
closing on the financing did not constitute 
an "executory accord," because there was 
no meeting of the minds. See Golden Key 
Realty, Inc. v. Manias, 699 P.2d 780, 783 
(Utah 1985); Sugarhouse Finance Co. v. 
Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369,1372 (Utah 1980). 
The settlement statement lists the contract 
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price as $128,500. At trial, conflicting tes-
timony was introduced regarding whether 
defendant Olson ever agreed to this figure. 
Defendant Olson testified that he never 
agreed to a contract price in excess of 
$116,000 per unit. Similarly, defendant 
Lund's position is that he signed the settle-
ment statement merely to assist defendant 
Olson to acquire long-term financing, but 
that the settlement statement did not con-
stitute an acknowledgment of specific 
amounts owed to plaintiffs. After review-
ing the record, we do not believe the trial 
court's finding that the parties did not in-
tend the settlement statement to constitute 
an executory accord is clearly erroneous. 
II. DUE PROCESS 
Defendants contend that they were de-
nied due process of law because the trial 
court's May 17, 1985 judgment was based 
on quantum meruit, a theory which was 
not pled, nor reserved by the trial court 
We disagree. 
[3-5] A hearing must be prefaced by 
timely notice which adequately informs the 
parties of the specific issues they must be 
prepared to meet. Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 
P.2d 1207, 1212 (Utah 1983). Issues not 
expressly raised in the pleadings, however, 
may be tried by the implied consent of the 
parties. General Ins. Co. v. Carnicero 
Dynasty Corp., 545 P.2d 502, 506 (Utah 
1976). Implied consent may be found 
where evidence is introduced without objec-
tion. Id Moreover, proof of a quasi-con-
tract under an allegation of a breach of an 
express contract does not violate due pro-
cess, absent surprise or prejudice. North 
Tillamook County Sanitary Authority v. 
Great American Ins. Co., 46 Or.App. 173, 
611 P.2d 319, 321 (1980). 
[6] Quantum meruit was, at least in-
ferentially, an issue at the supplemental 
hearing. The supplemental hearing fo-
cused on the plans and specifications un-
derlying the cost breakdown and the addi-
tional costs plaintiffs incurred because of 
defendant Olson's requested changes in the 
duplex specifications. There is no showing 
that defendants were surprised or prevent-
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ed from presenting all evidence pertaining 
to the reasonable costs of construction or 
the benefits defendants received, nor that 
they were prejudiced by the trial judge 
relying on the theory of quantum meruit 
Furthermore, any possible prejudice de-
fendants may have suffered is cured by 
our remand for a new trial on the issue of 
damages. 
III. DEFENDANT LUND'S LIABILITY 
The trial court, in its final May 17, 1985 
judgment, without any supportive findings 
or explanation, relieved defendant Lund of 
liability. The court did this although it had 
previously held him liable for the $23,-
741.54 judgment. We are unable to ascer-
tain whether the court found that defend-
ant Lund requested plaintiffs to perform 
services, and if so, to what extent, or 
whether any benefit was conferred upon 
defendant Lund by plaintiffs' construction 
of the duplexes. If defendant Lund re-
quested services and received a benefit 
which would be unjustly retained, he is 
liable under quantum meruit1 Conse-
quently, we remand to the trial court for 
findings on this issue and an entry of judg-
ment consistent with our opinion. 
IV. MEASURE OF DAMAGES 
Despite our approval of the trial court's 
decision to base recovery on quantum me-
ruit we, nonetheless, reverse the May 17, 
1985 judgment because we find that it is 
legally and factually inconsistent 
In its August 4,1983 judgment, the trial 
court based plaintiffs' damages on the cost 
breakdown and held both defendants liable. 
[7] In its May 17, 1985 judgment, the 
court determined that there was no meet-
ing of the minds as to the plans and specifi-
cations underlying the cost breakdown, re-
versing its prior conclusion. The court, 
therefore, premised its May 17, 1985 judg-
ment strictly on quantum meruit None-
theless, in calculating the measure of dam-
Sr Of course, the court, on remand, could find 
other theories of recovery against defendant 
Lund based upon the evidence, including part-
nership or joint venture. 
ages assessed against defendant Olson, the 
court gave defendant Olson credit for the 
August 4, 1983 judgment—a judgment 
based on a theory that the court had reject-
ed. Further, the court did not indicate 
whether defendant Lund was still bound by 
the earlier judgment entered against him. 
By giving defendant Olson credit for the 
August 4, 1983 judgment, an earlier judg-
ment which the May 17,1985 judgment, on 
its face, seems to supercede, the trial court, 
in effect, reduced the amount of plaintiffs' 
recovery. The trial court did not indicate 
whether it intended the May 17,1985 judg-
ment to be in addition to the August 4, 
1983 judgment, or instead of it1 In light 
of these observations, we find that the May 
17,1985 judgment is internally inconsistent 
and, if enforced, patently unfair to plain-
tiffs under any interpretation of the evi-
dence. Therefore, we reverse and remand 
for a determination of damages under 
quantum meruit 
[8] Because we remand for further pro-
ceedings, we attempt to provide some guid-
ance to the trial court See Utah Farm 
Production Credit Ass'n v. Watts, 737 
P.2d 154, 158 (Utah 1987). Quantum me-
ruit is an action initiated by a plaintiff to 
recover payment for labor performed in a 
variety of circumstances in which that 
plaintiff, for some reason, would not be 
able to sue on an express contract Recov-
ery under quantum meruit presupposes 
that no enforceable written or oral contract 
exists. See Blue Ridge Sewer Improve-
ment Diet v. Lowry A AMOS., Inc., 149 
Arii. 873, 718 P.2d 1026 (CtApp.1986). 
Confusion surrounds the use and applica-
tion of quantum meruit, see, e.g., Inter-
form Co. v. Mitchell, 575 F.2d 1270 (9th 
Cir.1978) (attempting to apply Idaho law); 
Hartwell Corp. v. Smith, 107 Idaho 134, 
686 P.2d 79 (CtApp.1984), because courts 
have used the terms quantum meruit 
contract implied in fact, contract implied in 
law, quasi-contract, unjust enrichment, 
and/or restitution without analytical prech 
4. The earlier judgment was not made final pur-
suant to Utah RXiv.P. 54(b) and therefore 
would teem to be legally merged into or super-
ceded by the May 17 final judgment 
DAVIES 
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•k>n. See, e.g., Buramca Ecosys v. Roedi-
ger Pittsburgh, Inc., 681 F.Supp. 415, 422 
(E.D.IU.1984) (discussing quasi-contract 
claim in quantum meruit litigation); Ida-
ho Lumber, Inc. v. Buck, 109 Idaho 737, 
710 P.2d 647, 655-57 (CtApp.1985); Sharp 
v. Laubersheimer, 847 N.W.2d 268, 270 
(Minn.1984); Ellis-Jones, Inc. v. Western 
Waterproofing Co., 66 N.CApp. 641, 646-
47, 812 S.E.2d 215, 218 (1984). 
Quantum meruit has two distinct 
branches. Both branches, however, are 
rooted in "justice," see Lakeshore Fin. 
Corp. v. Comstock, 587 F.Supp. 426, 429 
(W.D.Mich. 1984), to prevent the defend-
ant's enrichment at the plaintiffs expense. 
See Hazelwood Water Dist. v. First Union 
Management, Inc., 78 Or.App. 226, 715 
P.2d 498 (1986). 
[9,10] Contract implied in law, also 
known as quasi-contract or unjust enrich-
ment, is one branch of quantum meruit 
A quasi-contract is not a contract at all, but 
rather is a legal action in restitution. See 1 
A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 19, at 
44, 46 (1963). The elements of a quasi-con-
tract, or a contract implied in law, are: (1) 
the defendant received a benefit; (2) an 
appreciation or knowledge by the defend-
ant of the benefit; (3) under circumstances 
that would make it unjust for the defend-
ant to retain the benefit without paying for 
it See Berrett v. Stevens, 690 P.2d 553, 
557 (Utah 1984) (using the term "unjust 
enrichment"). The measure of recovery 
under quasi-contract, or contract implied in 
law, is the value of the benefit conferred on 
the defendant (the defendant's gain) and 
not the detriment incurred by the plaintiff, 
see First Inv. Co. v. Andersen, 621 P.2d 
683, 687 (Utah 1980), or necessarily the 
reasonable value of the plaintiffs services. 
[11] A contract implied in fact is the 
second branch of quantum meruit A 
contract implied in fact is a "contract" es-
tablished by conduct See Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts § 5 comment a 
(1981). The elements of a contract implied 
in fact are: (1) the defendant requested the 
plaintiff to perform work; (2) the plaintiff 
expected the defendant to compensate him 
or her for those services; and (3) the de-
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fendant knew or should have known that 
the plaintiff expected compensation. See 
Kintz v. Read, 28 Wash.App. 731, 626 P.2d 
52, 55 (1981); see also Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Contract* § 5 comment a (1981) 
(providing that terms of promise or agree-
ment are those expressed in language of 
parties or implied in fact from other con-
duct); 1 S. Williston, Williston on Con-
tracts § 3, at 8-10 (1957) (defining implied 
in fact contracts as obligations arising 
from mutual agreement and intent to prom-
ise where parties do not express agreement 
and promise in words); 1 A. Corbin, Corbin 
on Contracts § 18 (1963) (noting that im-
plied contracts impose contractive duty by 
reason of promissory expression and are no 
different than express contracts, although 
different in mode of expressing assent). 
'Technically, recovery in contract implied 
in fact is the amount the parties intended 
as the contract price. If that amount is 
unexpressed, courts will infer that the par-
ties intended the amount to be the reason-
able market value of the plaintiffs servic-
es." Kovacic, A Proposal to Simplify 
Quantum Meruit Litigation, 35 Am.U.L. 
Rev. 547, 556 (1986). 
In the case before us, the trial court 
correctly found that there was no express 
contract, and thus that plaintiffs' recovery 
must be based on quantum meruit The 
court further held that plaintiffs should 
recover their reasonable costs of construct-
ing the duplexes. The court correctly 
found a contract implied in fact. It is 
undisputed that defendant Olson orally re-
quested plaintiff Davies to construct the 
duplexes, that plaintiffs expected Olson to 
compensate them for those services, and 
that Olson knew that plaintiffs expected 
compensation. Thus, we remand as to de-
fendant Olson for a determination of the 
reasonable value of plaintiffs' services in 
constructing the duplexes, and an entry of 
judgment against him for that amount 
We are unable to determine what the 
court found as to defendant Lund. Thus 
we remand as to defendant Lund for find-
ings on whether he requested plaintiffs to 
perform work, and if so, to what extent, or 
whether he received any unjust benefits as 
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a result of plaintiffs' efforts. These find-
ings will support the court's conclusion as 
to whether defendant Lund is liable to 
plaintiffs under quantum meruit—* con-
tract implied in law, or quantum meruit 
—a contract implied in fact, or neither. As 
is explained more fully supra, the measure 
of damages may differ depending on the 
theory adopted. 
V. INTEREST 
In awarding damages, the applicable le-
gal rate of interest must also be deter-
mined. The 1981 amendment to section 
15-1-1 increased the legal rate of interest 
from 6 percent to 10 percent Utah Code 
Ann. § 15-1-1 (1986). 
[12] The statutory legal rate of interest 
is applied from the date payment is due to 
the judgment date. See Lignell v. Berg, 
593 P.2d 800, 809 (Utah 1979). 
[13] The trial court found July 7, 1981, 
the date defendant Lund signed the settle-
ment statement, as the due date, as that 
was the date the benefit was conferred. It 
was also on this date that defendants ac-
knowledged an obligation to pay plaintiffs 
for their services in constructing the du-
plexes. We find that this determination is 
supported by substantial evidence and 
therefore will not disturb it on appeal. See 
id at 810. Based on this factual determi-
nation, we find the appropriate rate of in-
terest is 10 percent 
The May 17, 1985 judgment is affirmed 
in part and reversed in part The case is 
remanded for further proceedings consist-
ent with this opinion. Each party to bear 
its own costs. 
GARFF, and ORME, JJ., concur. 
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JAYE SMITH CONSTRUCTION COMPA-
NY, Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
BOARD OF EDUCATION, GRANITE 
SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 14497. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Jan. 26, 1977. 
Appeal was taken from a judgment of 
the Third District Court, Salt Lake County, 
Stewart M. Hanson, Sr., J., entered in favor 
of contractor in action to recover costs of 
roof decking materials supplied school dis-
trict under construction contract. The Su-
preme Court, Ellett, J., held that even 
7. Priestly v. State, 19 Ariz. 371, 171 P. 137, 
note 1; Scrivener v. State, 63 Okl.Cr. 418, 75 
P.2d 1154; Stevens v. State, 94 Okl.Cr. 216, 232 
P.2d 949. 
though letter from contractor placed in 
sealed envelope containing $164,022 bid for 
construction of school addition stated that 
bid was contingent on certain price being 
paid for roof decking material, where letter 
was not read as part of bid and contractor 
allowed bid to be accepted without calling 
attention to such contingency and subse-
quently entered contract providing for pay-
ment of $164,022 for construction of school 
addition, contractor was bound to construct 
school addition for $164,022 and was not 
entitled to recover additional costs of roof 
decking. 
Reversed. 
Maughan, J., filed a dissenting opinion 
in which Wilkins, J., concurred. 
1. Schools and School Districts *»86(2) 
Even though letter from contractor 
placed in sealed envelope containing $164,-
022 bid for construction of school addition 
stated that bid was contingent on certain 
price being paid for roof decking material, 
where letter was not read as part of bid and 
contractor allowed bid to be accepted with-
out calling attention to such contingency 
and subsequently €gj£ered contract provid-
ing for payment of $164,022 for construc-
tion of school addition, contractor was 
bound to construct school addition for $164,-
022 and was not entitled to recover addi-
tional costs of roof decking. 
2. Schools and School Districts *=>80(2) 
Bid submitted by contractor for con-
struction of school addition was merely of-
fer to enter into contract; thus, when writ-
ten construction contract was agreed to and 
signed, all prior offers and counteroffers 
were merged therein. 
3. Evidence «=»448 
Where contract for construction of 
school addition was clear and unambiguous, 
trial court should not have admitted any 
8. 47 Am.Jur.2d, Jury, Sec. 267; 160 A.L.R. 753, 
767; Cwach v. V. S., 212 F.2d 520 (8th Cir. 
1954); People v. Franklin, 56 Cal.App.3d 18, 
128 Cal.Rptr. 94 (1976); State v. Persinger, 62 
Wash.2d 362, 382 P.2d 497 (1963). 
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evidence of what contractor's intentions 
were when it made its bid. 
4. Schools and School Districts *=>86(2) 
Requiring contractor to construct 
school addition for amount of agreed to 
contract price did not constitute unjust en-
richment to school district which learned of 
additional cost for roofing material prior to 
completion of school addition. 
5. Contracts *=>5 
There is no unjust enrichment to one 
who compels other party to live up to his 
agreement. 
Ted D. Smith and M. Byron Fisher, of 
Fabian & Clendenin, Salt Lake City, for 
defendant and appellant. 
Dwight L. King, Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiff and respondent. 
ELLETT, Justice: 
The appellant requested bids from con-
tractors to build an addition to a junior 
high school gymnasium according to plans 
ar>4 specifications prepared by an architect. 
7 he bids were all submitted in sealed en-
velopes, and on March 6,1973, at the offices 
of the Granite School District, a bid-open-
ing session was conducted to determine the 
low bidder pursuant to Section 53-11-1, 
l'.^.A.1953, which provides: 
. . At the time and place speci-
fied in said notice the board shall meet 
and publicly open and read all proposals 
received, and, if satisfactory bids have 
been received, shall award the contract to 
th<. lowest responsible bidder. 
Thi bids, which were submitted in sealed 
envelopes, were opened by Mr. Davidson, 
Director of New School Facilities, handed 
t«» the architect; and then to Dr. Call, su-
perintendent of the Board of Education. 
The envelope of the respondent contained a 
litter signed by Mr. Jaye Smith, its presi-
dent, stating: 
Hue to the difficulty in determining 
the price and availability of the three 
inch roof deck material specified . ., 
1 hau submitted my proposal on the ba-
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sis of a cost of 36 cents per square foot of 
roof area. I use this figure only as a 
basis for arriving at a total bid price, and 
stipulate a change in contract price, ei-
ther higher or lower as the information 
becomes available. 
The letter was not noticed by anyone 
present and was not read as a part of the 
proposed bid in ascertaining the low bidder. 
The bid as made and read was as follows: 
Gentlemen: 
Having carefully examined the plans, 
specifications, all documents and addenda 
entitled: "Physical Education Addition, 
Kearns Junior High School" Granite 
School District at 4040 West 5305 South, 
Kearns, Utah as prepared by ARTHUR 
K. OLSEN, Architect, 357 East Fifth 
South, Salt Lake City, Utah, and having 
examined the site of the proposed con-
struction, and understanding all govern-
ing conditions under which the work is to 
be done, the undersigned proposes to fur-
nish all labor, material, services, utilities, 
tools, machinery, taxes, insurance and in-
cidentals for the: 
BID STRUCTURE: 
A. Base Bid—Completion Date August 
10, 1973: Sum of One Hundred Sixty 
Four Thousand Twenty Two Dollars 
($164,022.00). 
Completion of Work : If the Undersigned 
be notified of the acceptance of this pro-
posal within fifteen days after the date 
hereof, he agrees to execute a contract 
agreement in the form bound in these 
specifications for the above work for the 
above stated compensation, and to guar-
antee completion of all phases of this 
work ready for occupancy on or before 
August 10, 1973 (See Bid Structure). The 
Liquidated Damages Condition of the 
"Agreement" form has been considered in 
making this proposal and will pertain to 
whichever time is selected in the bid 
structure. 
Bond: The Undersigned agrees, if 
awarded the Contract, to furnish and de-
liver to the Board bonds subject to the 
approval of the Board of Education on 
the bond forms bound in these specifica-
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tions, each in the amount equal to 100 
percent of the contract sum. The pro-
posed surety company is United Pacific 
Insurance 
The respondent allowed his bid to be read 
and accepted by the Board of Education 
without calling attention to the fact that 
the amount of his bid was not to be the sum 
which he expected to receive if his bid price 
was the low figure ($164,022.00). Had he 
done so, his bid would not have been con-
sidered the lowest bid for no one knew 
what his ultimate price might be. 
The costs of labor and material are al-
ways subject to fluctuations, and a contrac-
tor who makes a bid takes the risk of a rise 
in prices and is entitled to the benefits in 
case of a lowering thereof. As a part of 
the bid submitted, the respondent made the 
following paragraphs: 
Agreement: The Undersigned had read 
the "Agreement" form thoroughly and 
hereby agrees with and has included all 
the costs of all provisions contained 
therein. 
District Bid Depository: The Under-
signed has abided by the spirit and the 
letter of the "District Bid Depository" 
described in the "Addendum to the Gen-
eral Conditions" and "Instructions to Bid-
ders" and the published "Notice to Con-
tractors". 
Errors: The Undersigned has checked 
carefully all of the above figures and 
understands that the Board will not be 
responsible for any errors or omissions on 
the part of the Undersigned in making 
this bid. 
Collusion : The Undersigned hereby cer-
tifies that this bid is genuine and not 
sham or collusive or made in the interest 
or in behalf of any person not herein 
named, and that the Undersigned has not 
in any manner sought by collusion to 
secure for himself an advantage over any 
other bidder. 
Two days later Mr. Smith, president of 
the respondent company, met with the rep-
resentatives of the school board and they 
formally signed the contract which provid-
ed, among other things, 
The Board agrees to pay the Contractor 
for the said work and materials and for 
the full performance by the Contractor of 
all covenants and conditions in the man-
ner and form herein set out for the Gen-
eral Contract, including Plans and Speci-
fications, the sum of One Hundred Sixty 
Four Thousand Twenty Two ($164,022.) 
dollars subject to additions and deduc-
tions as herein provided, and subject to 
the provisions of this Agreement. 
Nowhere in the contract is there any 
mention of a contingency in the amount to 
be paid the contractor. Moreover, by plain-
tiffs own admission, no mention whatsoev-
er of a contingent bid was made during the 
meeting in which Mr. Smith signed the 
contract. 
At trial Mr. Smith testified as follows: 
Q. On March 8, 1973, was there any 
discussion at that time with Mr. Davidson 
as to the contingency in your bid for the 
roof decking amount? 
A. No, there wasn't. 
Q. Did you in fact sign the contract on 
March 8th? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And did you sign that in the amount 
of $164,022.00? 
A. I signed the contract with that 
amount written on it. 
It was not until approximately six weeks 
later that Mr. Davidson discovered the ex-
istence of the letter. This occurred after 
Mr. Davidson heard about the possible con-
tingency and checked the bid envelope 
where he found the note stashed away 
among the papers contained therein. 
[1,2] The formal contract signed March 
8, 1973, governs the parties hereto; and 
even if Mr. Smith had his fingers crossed 
when the bids were opened and read, the 
signing of the formal contract bound him to 
construct the addition to the gymnasium 
according to the plans and specifications for 
the total sum of $164,022.00, subject to ad-
ditions and deductions; and there were no 
additions or deductions agreed to, save one 
$150 item for striping. The bid submitted 
was merely an offer to enter into a contact 
JAYE SMITH CONST, v. BD, 
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and when the written contract was agreed 
to and signed, all prior offers and counter-
offers were merged therein.1 
[3] The contract was clear and unam-
biguous, and the court should not have per-
mitted any evidence of what the intentions 
of plaintiff were when it made its bid. The 
material thing is what did the parties in-
tend when they signed the contract? The 
answer to that is clear—they intended that 
plaintiff construct the building according to 
the plans and specifications and for the 
defendant to pay the sum of $164,022.00. 
[4] In its memorandum decision, the tri-
al court said, "However, before the work 
was completed they did learn of the letter, 
learned of the extra cost, and to now permit 
the defendant to take advantage of plain-
tiff's position would be inequitable and 
would constitute in effect an unjust enrich-
ment to the defendant . . .." 
[5] Since when have courts rewritten 
contracts in order to enhance the profits of 
one of the parties thereto or to prevent loss 
to the other? There is no unjust enrich-
ment to one who compels the other party to 
\)\L up to his agreement. 
The judgment of the trial court is re-
versed except as to the award of $150 made 
for striping. Costs are awarded to the ap-
pellant. 
HENRIOD, C. J., and CROCKETT, J., 
concur. 
MAUGHAN, Justice (dissenting): 
On appeal is a judgment in an action to 
recover the cost of certain redwood decking 
supplied to defendant under a construction 
agreement. At trial, plaintiff was allowed 
to amend his complaint to seek recovery of 
$150 for extra work performed under the 
agreement. Judgment was rendered for 
plaintiff. We should affirm, with costs to 
plaintiff. 
In response to public invitation by de-
fendant, plaintiff submitted a bid for the 
alteration of a gymnasium in a junior high 
school. The bid for $164,022.00 was sub-
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mitted with a letter, hereinafter referred to 
as the contingency letter on March 6, 1973. 
Plaintiff stated therein: 
Due to the difficulty in determining 
price and availability of the three inch 
roof deck material specified for the Phys-
ical Education addition to Keams Junior 
High School, I have submitted my propos-
al on the basis of a cost of 36 cents per 
square foot of roof deck area. I use this 
figure only as a basis for arriving at a 
total bid price, and stipulate a change in 
contract price, either higher or lower as 
the information becomes available. 
The bids were opened by a representative 
of defendant. There was a dispute as to 
whether the contingency letter was re-
moved at that time; and defendant has 
vigorously contended it did not have knowl-
edge of the contents of the contingency 
letter, until four to six weeks later. On the 
same day, the bids were opened, March 6, 
1973, defendant's agent, the Superintend-
ent, recommended plaintiff's bid be accept-
ed; an appropriate motion was made, and 
defendant accepted plaintiff's bid. On 
March 8, 1973, a memorandum of this con-
tract was executed by the parties. 
The evidence adduced at trial indicated 
the brand of decking designated, in the 
plans and specifications, viz., Weyerhaeuser 
Blue Star and Red Star, was not available, 
or being manufactured. Consequently, no 
accurate determination of price could be 
made at the time of bidding. By a letter 
dated May 23, 1973, plaintiff informed de-
fendant he had procured the required deck-
ing. Plaintiff explained the cost of the 
decking was $6,610.98; that he had allocat-
ed only $3,008 in the bid, leaving a differ-
ence of $3,602.98. 
His letter concluded: 
If you need further information or 
have questions regarding this matter, 
please call or write immediately. 
Defendant conceded it had knowledge of 
the contingency letter approximately six 
weeks after the bid was accepted. Defend-
1. Restatement, Contracts, Sec. 237. 
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ant refused payment of the additional sum 
on the ground the written agreement had a 
contract price of $164,022.00. 
The matter was tried to the court. Plain-
tiff offered the contingency letter, defend-
ant objected; asserting the parol evidence 
rule. The letter was admitted, and the 
court granted defendant a continuing objec-
tion. 
The court found the contingency letter to 
be with plaintiffs bid, at the time defend-
ant's representative opened the letter; and 
the letter was noticed or should have been 
noticed in the exercise of reasonable care. 
It was further found the letter was part of 
plaintiffs bid, and became part of the con-
tract executed on March 8, 1973. Further-
more, before the work was completed, de-
fendant learned of the letter and the extra 
cost. Under such circumstances, it would 
have been inequitable, and have constituted 
an unjust enrichment if plaintiff were re-
quired to bear the cost. 
On appeal, defendant contends the court 
erred in finding the contingency letter be-
came part of the contract. The ground 
asserted is defendant's representatives were 
not aware of it; therefore they could not 
have asserted to its terms. 
Restatement, Contracts, Sec. 70, provides: 
One who makes a written offer which 
is accepted, or who manifests acceptance 
of the terms of a writing which he should 
reasonably understand to be an offer or 
proposed contract, is bound by the con-
tract, though ignorant of the terms of the 
writing or of its proper interpretation. 
Defendant fails to distinguish between 
mutual assent and the manifestation indi-
cating such assent. The latter is what the 
law requires.1 If a misunderstanding is 
owing to the fault of one party, and the 
other party understands the transaction ac-
cording to the natural meaning of the 
words or other acts, both parties are bound 
by that meaning.2 
1. See Restatement, Contracts, Sec. 20, Com-
ment a. 
Plaintiff presented his contingency letter 
with his bid and proceeded to give defend-
ant notice of the adjustment in price in a 
timely manner. Defendant manifested ac-
ceptance of plaintiff's offer. It cannot now 
negate its assent by asserting it was with-
out knowledge of the terms of the offer-
when such lack of knowledge was the prod-
uct of its own negligence. 
A further contention is the court erred in 
admitting the contingency letter. This on 
the ground it was barred by the parol evi-
dence rule. 
The provision in the agreement executed 
subsequent to the acceptance of plaintiffs 
bid, is cited: 
The Board agrees to pay the contractor 
for the said work and materials and for 
the full performance by the Contractor of 
all the covenants and conditions in the 
manner and form herein set out for the 
General Contract, including Plans and 
Specifications, the sum of One Hundred 
Sixty Four Thousand Twenty Two ($164,-
022.) dollars subject to additions and de-
ductions as herein provided, and subject 
to the provisions of this Agreement. 
Defendant contends this provision repre-
sents the final and complete expression of 
the agreement of the parties, viz., an inte-
grated contract, the terms of which may 
not be added or varied by prior written 
agreements relating thereto.1 
Whenever a litigant insists that a writ-
ing that is before the court is an integra-
tion and asks the application of the parol 
evidence rule, the court must determine 
as a question of fact whether the parties 
did in fact adopt a particular writing or 
writings as the final and complete ex-
pression of their bargain. In determining 
the issue of the completeness of the inte-
gration in writing, evidence extrinsic to 
the writing itself is admissible. Parol 
testimony is admissible to show the cir-
3. See Restatement, Contracts. Sec. 237. 
2. See Restatement, Contracts, Sec. 501, Com-
ment b. 
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cumstances under which the agreement 
was made and the purpose for which the 
instrument was executed.4 [Emphasis 
supplied] 
The court after evaluating all the evi-
dence, concerning the transaction found the 
contingency letter to be part of the bid, and 
to have become a part of the contract. 
It was a question of fact whether the 
agreement of March 8, 1973 was an inte-
grated contract, viz., had the parties mani-
fested assent not merely to its provisions, 
but as a final statement of the intentions 
concerning its substance.5 The question 
was found adversely to defendant. There is 
substantial evidence in the record to sustain 
the finding. 
Finally, defendant assigns as error the 
permission given to plaintiff allowing 
amendment of his complaint during the tri-
al, to recover $150 for striping a floor. This 
work was not included in the contract, but 
was requested as additional work. Defend-
ant objected to the introduction of evidence 
establishing this claim on the ground there 
had been no discovery nor had the Board 
had the opportunity to look into what work 
was done. 
The work had been set forth in plaintiff's 
answers to defendant's interrogatories. 
Plaintiff represented to the court defendant 
had promised to pay the sum, but had not. 
A letter in evidence, authorized by defend-
ant's agent, stated there was no objection 
to the part of the Change Order referring 
to this work. The amendment was allowed 
on the ground the claim was not a surprise 
to defendant. 
The relevant provisions of Rule 15(b) 
state: 
. . If evidence is objected to at 
the trial on the ground that it is not 
within the issues made by the pleadings, 
the court may allow the pleadings to be 
amended when the presentation of the 
merits of the action will be subserved 
4. Bullfrog Manna, Inc. v. Lentz, 28 Utah 2d 
261, 266, 501 P.2d 266 (1972). 
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thereby and the objecting party fails to 
satisfy the court that the admission of 
such evidence would prejudice him in 
maintaining his action or defense upon 
the merits. The court shall grant a con-
tinuance, if necessary, to enable the ob-
jecting party to meet such evidence. 
The action of the trial court when evalu-
ated by the standards set forth in Rule 
15(b), does not indicate an abuse of discre-
tion.* 
WILKINS, J., concurs in the views ex-
pressed in the dissenting opinion of Mr. 
Justice MAUGHAN. 
O I KEYKU*BERSYSTE*> 
5. See Restatement, Contracts, Sec. 228, Com-
ment a 
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not provide as to any obligation plaintiff^ 
exJiusband has to support her. NODMS 
ther^any showing as to what the income of 
the other individuals in the household is, 
nor whether it is or should be "available to 
the entire ro>up for their support, care and 
maintenance\ and it is not^lear whether 
the plaintiff i s \ r is not obligated to share 
in the expenses inairre<j4>y others for the 
common maintenance 
On the basis of whatHms been said above, 
it is our conclusion that\he motion to dis-
miss the comphnnt was nonoroperly grant-
ed and thatydiis case shouldNbe remanded 
for further proceedings not inconsistent 
with thi/opinion. No costs awarded. 
^LETT, C. J., and MAUGHAN, 
tfS and HALL, JJ., concur. 
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Oealon MANN, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
AMERICAN WESTERN LIFE INSUR-
ANCE COMPANY, Defendant 
and Respondent. 
No. 15506. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Oct. 26, 1978. 
Insurance sales agent brought action 
against insurer for damages arising out of 
alleged wrongful termination of agency re-
lationship between himself and insurer. 
The Third District Court, Salt Lake County, 
Stewart M. Hanson, Jr., J,, directed verdict 
for insurer, and agent appealed. The Su-
preme Court, Maughan, J., held that: (1) 
evidence was insufficient to justify submis-
sion to jury issue of whether written con-
tract between parties was orally modified 
to conform with insurer's contract with a 
partnership so that insurer should be or-
dered to pay commissions to agent accord-
ingly, and (2) evidence was not sufficient to 
justify submission to jury issue of whether 
insurer terminated its agency contract with 
agent in bad faith and thus should respond 
in damages for such tortious conduct. 
Affirmed. 
1. Insurance ^»79 
In action on insurance sales agent's 
claims for damages arising out of alleged 
wrongful termination of agency relation-
ship between himself and insurer, evidence 
was insufficient to justify submission to 
jury of issue whether written contract be-
tween parties was orally modified to con-
form with insurer's contract with a partner-
ship so that insurer should be ordered to 
pay commissions to agent accordingly, since 
reasonable jurors could not construe parties' 
conversations on their contract as constitut-
ing modification of insurer's rights with 
respect to termination afforded by parties' 
contract given fact that such subject did 
not even arise in course of conversations. 
2. Contracts *=>324(1) 
It is not a general precept of contract 
law that, whenever one party to a contract 
can show injury flowing from exercise of a 
contract right by other, a basis for relief 
will be somehow devised by courts. 
3. Insurance s=»79 
In action on insurance sales agent's 
claims for damages arising out of alleged 
wrongful termination of agency relation-
ship between himself and insurer, evidence 
that operative agency agreement on date of 
agency termination provided agency could 
be terminated by either party on 30 days' 
written notice to other and provided how 
premiums paid after termination would be 
paid, but did not require that a terminating 
party express or have good cause for termi-
nation was not sufficient to justify submis-
sion to jury of whether insurer terminated 
its agency contract with agent in bad faith 
and thus should respond in damages for 
such tortious conduct. 
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4. Contracts ^»5 
Recovery in quasi contract is not avail-
able where there is an express contract 
covering subject matter of litigation. 
Robert J. De Bry and Valden P. Living-
ston, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appel-
lant. 
F. S. Prince, Jr. and Randy L. Dryer of 
Prince, Yeales & Geldzahler, Salt Lake 
City, for defendant and respondent. 
MAUGHAN, Justice: 
Appeal from directed verdict or summary 
disposition of claims for damages arising 
out of alleged wrongful termination of 
agency relationship between appellant and 
respondent insurance company. Appellant 
asserts three theories of action, tort, breach 
of contract, and restitution. We affirm, 
and award costs to respondent. 
This action grows out of the termination 
of a contract under which appellant acted 
as an insurance sales agent for respondent, 
hereafter American. The written instru-
ment appellant, hereafter Mann, concedes 
to be the foundation of the agency relation-
ship provides for termination by either par-
ty on thirty days written notice to the oth-
er. It further defines Mann's right to par-
ticipate in premiums paid after termination, 
limiting that right to certain renewal pre-
miums. It is not disputed American is pay-
ing Mann commissions on renewal premi-
ums as the contract's termination clause 
provides. 
Throughout the period relevant to this 
litigation, American and a partnership 
known as "AIM" maintained a "general 
agency" relationship under a written con-
tract which provided more generous com-
missions to AIM than Mann's contract pro-
vided for him. Moreover, the AIM contract 
did not treat the subject of its termination, 
and arguably AIM's right to share in premi-
ums attributable to its sales or the sales of 
agents it recruited could not be diminished 
by termination or otherwise. 
Mann claims (1) American terminated its 
agency contract with him in bad faith and 
should respond in damages for that tortious 
conduct, (2) the written contract between 
the parties was orally modified to conform 
with the AIM contract, and American 
should be ordered to pay commissions to 
Mann accordingly, (3) American has been 
unjustly enriched at Mann's expense and 
should be ordered to disgorge its uncon-
scionable profit under equity doctrines of 
restitution. 
The evidence shows Mann last signed an 
agency contract with American in 1971. In 
May of 1973, he became a salaried "Director 
of Agencies" for American, but submitted a 
formal letter of resignation from that posi-
tion in September of that year. No written 
notice of termination of the 1971 agency 
agreement had ever been given as that 
agreement contemplates, and Mann re-
sumed sales and agent recruitment activity 
for American. He again shared in the pre-
miums attributable to his sales and the 
sales of agents recruited by him or by his 
recruitees. His status was different from 
his presalaried status in the respects that 
American provided him an office in consid-
eration for consultant services, and began 
to refer to him as a "general agent." 
Nevertheless, Mann concedes the 1971 con-
tract survived the Director of Agencies epi-
sode, and remained the foundation of the 
parties' relationship. The court was not 
asked to construct an implied agreement 
from the parties' conduct. 
The evidence further shows Mann under-
took to negotiate an improved agency 
agreement, and there were conversations on 
the subject between him and American's 
then president, Mr. Matheson, in early 1974. 
On July 16, 1974, Matheson wrote appellant 
the following memorandum: 
1. We are amenable to your appoint-
ment as a general agent for the Compa-
ny. If you wish to submit a proposed 
agents contract, we would be happy to 
review it with you. We could approach 
this either on the basis of a non-exclusive, 
managing general agent as defined in the 
Utah Insurance Code, or as an exclusive, 
general agent for us. The commission 
scale would depend upon the exact nature 
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of our relationship, but in no event would 
we exceed a 100 percent commission on 
first year business. As a general agent 
you would be responsible for all of your 
own agency expenses including office 
rental, secretarial help, telephone, post-
age, etc. As to office space, we could 
possibly continue to make space available 
for you here at a specified rental. Should 
you elect to enter into a general agency 
relationship with us, we would consider 
transferring the agents which you have 
recruited directly for the Company to this 
date to such agency under your exclusive 
control with the agents consent. How-
ever, since these agents were recruited 
while you were a division manager for 
the Company, the maximum commission 
schedule in relation to the business pro-
duced by said agents would continue at 
the present 94 percent maximum. 
We are also amenable to continuing our 
present relationship with you as a divi-
sion manager direct with the Company at 
a 94 percent commission rate. In consid-
eration for special services in relation to 
conservation, product development, and 
general agency consultant, we will con-
tinue to furnish an office here at no 
expense to you. Your continued relation-
ship with the Company under AIM's su-
pervision is, of course, for you to deter-
mine with AIM subject to our ultimate 
review pursuant to your agents contract 
with us. 
Mann made no written response to the 
memo. His evidence that his agency agree-
ment was orally modified to conform with 
the AIM contract consists entirely of his 
following testimony about his conversations 
on January 3, 1975, with Mr. Matheson: 
Q. Tell the jury what was said by the 
parties on that occasion. 
A. Mr. Matheson had written down on 
paper a proposed general agent's con-
tract, starting at 94^ and, based on vol-
ume, working up to 100%. I told Frank 
that w as not acceptable at that time, that 
I wanted a contract just like AIM's. 
Q. And who is AIM? 
A. American International Marketing. 
And he agreed that he would give me a 
contract—he could not give me one just 
like AIM's because of the conflict with 
the 5%. He agreed to give me 100% and 
make some concessions for the other 5%. 
And that's Item No. 2, which, as it says in 
his notes, "concessions to his agency/' he 
would advance my agents on submit busi-
ness and he would advance the managers' 
overrides as a concession. 
Q. Anything else said during the meet-
ing? 
A. Yes. We discussed a 1% office allow-
ance. We talked about the straight com-
mission on my 988 account, and he was 
worried about that balance. So was I. 
He wanted that worked off. 
• • • • * * 
Q. Anything else said? 
A. Yes, He indicated that, for me to 
receive a general agent's contract, that I 
would have to vacate the office space at 
the home office. 
• * * • • • 
Q. Do you remember anything about the 
meeting? 
A. Only that in his notes he says, "Cleal-
on will consider." 
Q. Okay, now, was any conclusion 
reached? 
A. No. 
Q. What was— 
A. I said that I would think it over and 
that afternoon I stuck my head in the 
door and said, "Frank, we have got a 
deal. I will move next door. We can 
arrange for the rental of the office 
space." 
In the spring of 1976, new management 
for American was installed after a stock 
acquisition takeover. On August 6, 1976, 
appellant was given thirty-day notice of 
termination of the agency agreement. 
[1] Since the matter was the subject of 
directed verdict at the trial level, we are 
obliged to view the evidence in the light 
most favorable to appellant. To uphold the 
464 Utah 586 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
directed verdict, we must first concur that, 
even if a jury believed Mann's testimony 
and discredited American's, it could not, in 
the proper exercise of jury function, find 
the parties substituted the AIM contract for 
their 1971 agreement as the basis of their 
relationship. Reviewing appellant's testi-
mony reproduced above, we cannot conceive 
that reasonable jurors could construe the 
conversations as reported to constitute a 
cancellation or modification of American's 
rights, with respect to termination afforded 
by the 1971 agreement. The subject did 
not even arise in the course of conversation. 
A jury could very well find modification 
was effected, as to the provisions which 
were discussed, but not as to provisions 
which were ignored. The nature of an 
agent's right to share in premiums after 
agency termination is (as this suit demon-
strates) an element of major consequence in 
agency contracts. The notion that Ameri-
can intended, by Mr. Matheson's statements 
as reported, to magnify that right as enor-
mously as Mann's complaint suggests is not 
a notion reasonable minds could entertain. 
We hold, then, that directed verdict on 
Mann's contract claim was properly and 
correctly entered. 
Mann's next claim is for damages flowing 
from American's having terminated the 
agency agreement in "bad faith." Here 
again, to affirm the trial court, we must 
assume a jury would believe Mann's evi-
dence and we must nevertheless concur that 
a jury could not make findings to sustain a 
verdict. The trial court concluded the 1971 
agency agreement was the operative instru-
ment on the date of agency termination, 
and we have affirmed. The agreement spe-
cifically provides the agency may be termi-
nated by either party on thirty days written 
notice to the other and how premiums paid 
after termination will be paid. There is no 
contractual requirement that a terminating 
party express or have good cause for termi-
nation. 
Mann cites substantial authority for the 
proposition that, even though a party to a 
contract may have a right to terminate it 
without cause, he must nevertheless exer-
cise the right in good faith and not at a 
time or in a manner which inflicts unneces-
sary injury or works unconscionable injus-
tice. 
Courts have permitted considerations of 
equity to control over clear contract lan-
guage covering termination where, for ex-
ample, a dealer franchise agreement was 
terminated after the dealer had invested 
heavily in showroom facilities and parts in-
ventory (deTreville v. Outboard Marine 
Corp., 4th Cir., 439 F.2d 1099), where an 
employee was terminated just before a bo-
nus was payable which he had fully earned 
except for completing a minimum employ-
ment period (Coleman v. Greybar Electric 
Co., 5th Cir., 195 F.2d 374), where the 
threat of termination was used to discour-
age the plaintiff and others from asserting 
workmen's compensation rights (Frampton 
v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 
N.E.2d 425), and with respect to adhesion 
contracts. A variety of tort and contract 
theories have been contrived to permit re-
covery in these situations, and the "duty of 
good faith" theory which Mann advances is 
among them. 
[2] Whatever the justification for judi-
cial remaking of the parties' contracts in 
these extreme cases may have been, it can-
not be adopted as a general precept of 
contract law that, whenever one party to a 
contract can show injury flowing from the 
exercise of a contract right by the other, a 
basis for relief will be somehow devised by 
the courts. 
In this case, the equities in favor of Mann 
are hardly overwhelming. The contract un-
der which he operated for some fifteen 
years was productive for him. In 1974, he 
was invited to prepare and submit the kind 
of general agency agreement he wanted, 
and he declined to do so. He has not, as a 
result of the termination, ceased to share in 
premium production attributable to his past 
effort; he shares in that production in the 
manner his contract expressly contemplat-
ed. 
In Atkinson v. Equitable Life Assurance 
Society of the U. S., 519 F.2d 1112, the 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals considered a 
MANN v. AMERICAN 1 
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fact situation very similar to the one before 
us, but where the equities more strongly 
favored the terminated insurance agent. 
Atkinson's contract was terminated after 
13V2 years of operation. Substantial renew-
al commissions on business he had written 
became vested, under his contract, after 15 
years. In reversing judgment in Atkinson's 
favor, the court held the mere fact of termi-
nation when the investment was nine-
tenths earned would not support a judg-
ment. Here, we have in the record Mann's 
full presentation on the issue of bad faith. 
It consists entirely of evidence of his satis-
factory performance and the lack of good 
cause for termination. 
[3] This Court has previously demon-
strated strong reluctance to rewrite con-
tracts for litigants because the conse-
quences of enforcement of the contracts 
they signed seem unfair.1 Nothing about 
the circumstances of this case can overcome 
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that reluctance. It is unnecessary for us, in 
the context of this case, to announce that 
the exercise of a contract right in bad faith 
is or is not actionable. We merely concur 
the evidence in this case was not sufficient 
to justify the submission of any bad faith 
issue to a jury. 
[4] The restitution claim asserted by 
Mann is easily put to rest. Recovery in 
quasi contract is not available where there 
is an express contract covering the subject 
matter of the litigation. 
ELLETT, C. J., and CROCKETT, WIL-
KINS and HALL, JJ., concur. 
O I KEYNUHBERSrSTEM} 
1. Bullock v. Deseret Dodge Truck Center, 11 Utah 2d 1, 354 P.2d 559. 
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he District Court's findings,12 but indee 
favors those findings. 
[81 Finally defendants contend tha£ the 
District Court's findings of fact are/incon-
sistent Vith each other and must be set 
aside. Specifically, defendants assert that 
findings nok9 and 10 are inconsistent with 
other finding^made by the JCourt. These 
two findings are two of tnose urged by 
defendants themselves ann adopted by the 
Court upon defendants/second motion to 
amend the findings,\(5ted ante. Findings 
nos. 9 and 10 concenAhe issue of prescrip-
tive easement rather than the issue of the 
public roadway, and we perceive no tension 
between these/md other findings made by 
the Court. 
The decree of the District Cbprt is af-
firmed; c/fsts to plaintiffs. 
CROCKETT, C. J., and MAUGHA! 
HALL, JJ., concur. 
STEWART, J., concurs in the result. 
and 
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tion seeking declaratory ruling as to compu-
tation and disbursement of royalties. Les-
sees counterclaimed and cross claimed 
against lessors of mineral claims. Lessees 
and lessors settled their dispute, and assign-
ee objected to the settlement. The Third 
District Court, Salt Lake County, Dean L. 
Conder, J., approved the settlement and 
dismissed the amended complaint for fail-
ure to state a cause of action. Assignee 
appealed. The Supreme Court, Stewart, J., 
held that: (1) the settlement agreement 
made between the lessors and the lessees 
was a contract separate and apart from the 
original lease, and, therefore, since the 
smaller royalty payment which would result 
to the assignee as co-owner was contem-
plated by the terms of the lease, the settle-
ment was not an improper modification of 
the lease; (2) the assignee was an incidental 
third-party beneficiary of the original 
lease, and, therefore, could not maintain 
action under it; and (3) the lessors owed no 
fiduciary duty to the assignee as cotenant 
to make sure that highest royalty payments 
were received. 
Affirmed. 
RIO ALGOM CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
JIMCO LTD., Humeca Exploration Com-
pany, Jim L. Hudson, Juanita J. Meyer 
as Executrix of the Estate of Daniel H. 
Meyer, Eldon J. Card, Norma Hudson, 
Jean L. Card, Juanita J. Meyer, N. J. 
White, Audrey White, Wilma White, 
Otis Dibler, Dorothy Mae Dibler, Grace 
Davis, and Marlowe C. Smith, Defend-
ants and Respondents. 
No. 16032. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Sept. 19, 1980. 
Assignee of lease of mineral rights who 
was also co-owner of such rights filed ac-
12. That this is the rule of review in equity 
cases, see Prow City v. Lambert, Utah, 574 
1. Mines and Minerals *»64 
Where lessors of mineral claims were 
authorized to elect to waive their right to 
have royalties determined by external mar-
ket value of crude uranium, such waiver did 
not constitute modification of lease or viola-
tion of any rights of assignee of leasehold 
who was also owner of one-fourth of min-
eral claims. 
2. Mines and Minerals *=>64 
Where paragraph of lease of mineral 
claims allowed lessors to elect different 
method of calculation of royalties, and, un-
der express terms, once election was made 
it was effective for each year thereafter 
unless and until expressly revoked, subse-
quent assignee of leasehold who was also a 
P.2d 727 (1978); Maytime Manor, Inc. v. Stok> 
ermatic, Inc., Utah, 597 P.2d 866 (1979). 
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lessor and who was precluded by lease from 
participating in election had no legal right 
to challenge either election or refusal to 
revoke such election or settlement agree-
ment among royalty participants calling for 
permanent election. 
3. Mines and Minerals <*=>64 
Where lessors of mineral claims made 
election pursuant to express settlement 
agreement between lessors and lessees as to 
how royalties would be divided, agreement 
between lessors and lessees which constitut-
ed such election was separate contract from 
original lease, and, therefore, assignee of 
lease had no right to challenge agreement. 
4. Corporations <s=»197 
Owners of voting corporate stock have 
right to vote their stock as they please and 
are not obligated to defer to interests of 
minority stockholders; majority stockhold-
ers are subject only to restriction that they 
may not vote their stock for purpose of 
oppressing or defrauding minority stock-
holders. 
5. Mines and Minerals *=>$4 
Where assignee of lease of mineral 
claims had obvious conflict of interest as to 
calculation of royalties in that it was also 
part owner of original claim and recogni-
tion of assignee's power to vote on whether 
lessors could make election as to how royal-
ties were to be computed would give veto 
power over such choice to assignee, there 
was no oppressive or fraudulent conduct in 
lessors and lessees assignors ignoring inter-
est of assignee in settling their own dispute 
and agreeing to smaller amount of royalty 
payments. 
6. Contracts <*=>168 
Whether expressed or not, every con-
tract includes covenant of good faith with 
respect to dealings between the parties; 
parties to a contract must deal fairly and 
honestly with each other. 
7. Contracts «=> 143(3) 
A court will not make a better contract 
for the parties than they have made for 
themselves. 
8. Contracts «=»168 
An express agreement or covenant re-
lating to a specific contract right excludes 
the possibility of an implied covenant of a 
different or contradictory nature. 
9. Mines and Minerals «=»64 
Where assignee of lease of mineral 
claims was also part owner of original 
claim, lessors who were also owners were 
not required to subordinate their own inter-
ests to those of assignee in making their 
election as to how royalties were to be 
determined. 
10. Contracts «=»189 
Duty of good faith does not mean party 
vested with clear right is obligated to exer-
cise that right to its own detriment for the 
purpose of benefiting another party to the 
contract. 
11. Contracts <*=>189 
A court will not enforce asserted rights 
that are not supported by contract itself. 
12. Compromise and Settlement *=>17(2) 
Where lessors of mineral claim who had 
right to exercise election as to how royalties 
were to be calculated waived their right to 
revoke royalty election in order to settle 
lengthy and costly litigation over disposi-
tion of royalty payments, consideration paid 
to them for such settlement was not for 
interest in mining claims or other property 
in which assignee was co-owner with lessor 
and there was no evidence of bad faith on 
the part of lessor, assignee of lease could 
not challenge settlement made between les-
sor and lessee. 
13. Compromise and Settlement *=>8(1) 
Where lessors of mineral lease did not 
act in bad faith in agreeing to exercise 
option as to particular manner in which 
royalties were to be computed for purpose 
of settling litigation between lessors and 
original lessees and such settlement was 
approved by trial court, settlement agree-
ment would be upheld. 
14. Contract* <*=» 187(1) 
Third-party beneficiaries are persons 
who are recognized as having enforceable 
right created in them 
which they are not parties and for which 
they give no consideration. 
15. Contracts • » 187(1) 
For third-party beneficiary to have 
right to enforce right, intention of contract-
ing parties to confer separate and distinct 
benefit upon third party must be clear; 
third-party beneficiary who was incidental-
ly benefited may not recover. 
16. Contracts <*=> 187(1) 
Where there was no indication in origi-
nal mineral lease of any intention on part 
of lessors and lessees to confer upon subse-
quent assignee of such lease who was also 
co-owner of original claim any right to 
control exercise of option by lessors as to 
how royalties were to be computed or in-
deed to have it exercised in favor of assign-
ee^ self interest, assignee was third-party 
beneficiary of such agreement and could 
not recover. 
17. Tenancy in Common <s=>10 
In some situations fiduciary relation-
ship may exist between tenants in common, 
but mere fact of cotenancy alone does not 
create such relationship. 
18. Tenancy in Common e=>10 
Fiduciary relationship between coten-
ants is usually found when one cotenant of 
real property undertakes to act on behalf of 
another cotenant or takes advantage of oth-
er cotenants, often in course of acquiring 
paramount title or ousting other cotenants. 
19. Tenancy in Common <s=>22 
Where mineral lease assignee was also 
tenant in common owner of one-fourth of 
mineral claim and owners' amended lease 
with lessees assignors expressly vested roy-
alty election in the owners of the remaining 
1. Rio Algom Corporation is a foreign corpora-
tion qualified to do business in the State of 
Utah. It is a subsidiary of Atlas Alloys, Inc., 
which in turn is a subsidiary of Rio Algom, 
Ltd., of Canada 
2. The first group of defendants (the "Jimcos") 
takes its name from Jimco, Ltd., a limited part-
nership, which has more than 100 limited part-
ners. Humeca Exploration Company is a part-
nership whose partners, Jim L. Hudson, Juanita 
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by a contract to three-fourths interest and excluded assign-
ee from the election, the owners of the 
three-fourths interest owed no fiduciary 
duty as tenants in common to the assignee 
with respect to the election option. 
20. Mines and Minerals *»22 
Where amended complaint of assignee 
of mineral rights who was also co-owner of 
such rights claimed that its contractual 
rights and cotenancy status had been violat-
ed by agreement between lessors and les-
sees which resulted in reduced royalty pay-
ments to assignee as owner, lessors did not 
owe any fiduciary duty to assignee beyond 
implied covenant to exercise contractual 
rights in good faith, and, therefore, since 
election as to how royalties were to be 
computed was made in good faith and was 
not in violation of any fiduciary duty, 
amended complaint was properly dismissed. 
James B. Lee and Kent W. Winterholler 
of Parsons, Behle & Latimer, Salt Lake 
City, for plaintiff and appellant. 
Albert J. Col ton and Anthony L. Ramp-
ton of Fabian & Clendenin, Clifford Ashton 
of VanCott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy, 
and Clifford D. Vernon, Salt Lake City, 
William G. Waldeck, Grand Junction, Colo., 
for defendants and respondents. 
STEWART, Justice: 
The plaintiff, Rio Algom Corporation 
("Rio"),1 brought this action seeking a de-
claratory ruling as to the proper basis for 
computing and disbursing royalties payable 
by Rio as a lessee under lease agreements 
covering uranium producing properties in 
San Juan County, Utah. There are two 
groups of defendants: the Jimcos2 and Au-
dreys.3 The Jimcos counterclaimed against 
J. Meyer, and Eldon J. Card, are the general 
partners of Jimco, Ltd. Norma Hudson, Jean 
L. Card, and Juanita Meyer are also members 
of the Jimco defendant group. 
3. The Audrey defendants are individuals who 
participated in the original discovery of the 
uranium properties (or the widows of such per-
sons) and who are owners of undivided inter-
ests in the mineral claims. This group includes 
N. J. White, Audrey White, Wilma White, Otis 
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Rio and also cross-claimed against the Au-
dreys. The Audreys cross-claimed against 
the Jimcos and counterclaimed against Rio, 
alleging breach of contract and seeking 
payment of royalties above the amount 
which Rio claimed to be due. 
This appeal is taken by Rio from a dis-
trict court order dated August 29, 1978, 
which ruled that a settlement agreement 
dated July 10, 1978, between the Audreys 
and the Jimcos was enforceable as to the 
royalty rate to be paid by Rio and that the 
agreement did not violate any contract duty 
owed to Rio by any of the defendants. The 
court dismissed with prejudice all additional 
claims by Rio against the Audrey defend-
ants, the claims by the Audrey defendants 
against Rio and the Jimcos, and the claims 
by the Jimcos against the Audrey defend-
ants. The court ordered Rio to pay to the 
Audreys that portion of the royalties to 
which the Audreys were entitled under the 
Audrey lease and the settlement stipula-
tion. 
In 1964 the Audreys leased uranium prop-
erties to the predecessors in interest of the 
Jimcos. This lease was later superseded by 
a new agreement between the Audreys and 
the Jimcos (the "Amended Audrey Lease/* 
or "headlease") executed July 12, 1968, and 
back-dated to June 1, 1968. Prior to the 
execution of the amended Audrey lease, Rio 
acquired a V* undivided interest in the sub-
ject properties. In addition, in an agree-
ment dated June 3, 1968, the Jimcos grant-
ed to Rio an option to acquire Jimcos' rights 
and obligations as a lessee under the 
amended Audrey lease. Rio exercised the 
option June 18, 1968. In so doing Rio be-
came not only the lessee of all the proper-
ties subject to the Audrey lease, but also 
one of the lessors under the headlease with 
a lA undivided royalty interest. As consid-
eration for Jimcos* assignment to Rio, Rio 
agreed to pay royalties to the Jimcos, in 
addition to the royalties payable under the 
amended Audrey lease to the Audreys. 
The following diagram illustrates the 
various relationships among the parties: 
AUDREYS, Co-ovn«rs of 
unpatented Mineral clalM, 
(3/4 owner) 
RIO (1/4 ovnar) 
AMEWDED ADMIT LIA1I [R«adl*eM) 
JltfCOS 
(Lcaaee) 1 
RIO-JIHOO ASSICftMBrT ( 8 O M -
I tlaaa tha "Option Agrn—lit ' 1 
Aaalgoaa 
With 
To 
Roy* 
RIO 
of Leasehold 
lty Obligations 
Jl»coa and Under ! 
the Haadlaaae 
Pursuant to the assignment of the lease-
hold interest from the Jimcos, Rio com-
menced the mining of uranium ore from the 
subject properties. Rio contracted to sell to 
Duke Power Company the beneficiated 
product U3Og, also referred to as uranium 
concentrate or "yellowcake." 
The present dispute evolved from a po-
tential conflict between the Audrey-Jimco 
headlease provisions for alternative meth-
ods for computing royalties under that lease 
and the royalty provisions in the Jimco-Rio 
lease. Basically, two alternative royalty 
formulas for determining the royalty to be 
paid by the Jimcos (or its assignee) were 
provided under the headlease. The first 
formula was based on the sales price or 
gross value of the product sold or used by 
Rio: 8% of the sales price if crude ore were 
sold, or 4% of the gross value of yellowcake 
if yellowcake were sold. The second formu-
la was based on fair market value of crude 
ore. 
The royalty provisions of the Amended 
Audrey lease are found in Paragraphs 3.1 
and 3.2. Paragraph 3.1 provides: 
(a) In the event Lessee shall mine or 
extract ore from the Audrey Group which 
is sold in its raw or crude form Lessee 
shall pay Lessors a royalty equal to eight 
per cent (8%) of the 'Sales Price' (as here-
inafter defined) received by Lessee from 
the sale of all ores mined, produced and 
sold in the crude form from the Audrey 
Group . . . 
(b) In the event Lessee shall mine or 
extract ore from the Audrey Group and 
Dibler, Dorothy Mae Dibler, Grace Davis, and 
Marlowe Smith (who died after the commence-
ment of this action and is survived by his wife, 
Adrian). 
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recover therefrom for sale or use in com-
mercial quantities any of the minerals 
contained in such ore, and if the minerals 
so recovered shall be any uranium com-
pound, Lessee shall pay to Lessors a roy-
alty of four per cent (4%) of the 'Gross 
Value' of such compounds (as hereinafter 
defined). . . . 
Paragraph 3.2 of the Audrey agreement 
provides the alternative basis for the com-
putation of royalties. That provision allows 
the lessors to elect to have royalties com-
puted on the basis of the fair market value 
of crude ore, regardless of whether uranium 
concentrate or crude ore was sold by Rio. 
That provision states: 
Irrespective of the provisions set forth in 
paragraph 3.1 above, Lessors shall have 
the election and option to have royalties 
due them under the terms of this Lease 
calculated and paid upon the basis of 
eight percent (8%) of the fair market 
value at the mine portal of crude ore 
mined and produced from the Audrey 
Group. . . . 
Paragraph 3.2, which is critical in this 
dispute, also provides for an election by the 
lessors under the Audrey lease as to which 
royalty formula would be binding. That 
paragraph states: 
. . . [I]n order to exercise such election 
Lessors must unanimously agree and no-
tify Lessee in writing at least ninety (90) 
days prior to the commencement of any 
calendar year of their election to require 
royalties to be calculated and paid in such 
manner. After having given such notice, 
the election so made shall remain in force 
and effect for the next ensuing calendar 
year, and from year to year thereafter, 
unless the Lessors should unanimously 
agree to notify Lessee in writing of their 
revocation of said election, which notifi-
cation must be given at least ninety (90) 
days prior to the commencement of a 
calendar year and shall become effective 
at the commencement of, and remain in 
effect during the ensuing calendar year, 
and from year to year thereafter, unless 
another such notification of election is 
given at the time and in the manner as 
specified above. 
However, because of the assignment by 
the Jimcos to Rio, Rio was placed in a 
conflict of interest situation with the other 
lessors under the Audrey headlease as a 
result of its contractual right to receive 
one-fourth of the royalties earned under 
the Audrey lease and, at the same time, as 
a lessee with the obligation to pay the full 
amount of the royalties. Under these pro-
visions, Rio's interest was to pay the small-
est amount of royalties possible. To deal 
with that conflict of interest, Paragraph 
21.3 of the amended Audrey lease excluded 
Rio from voting in an election for selection 
of a royalty formula under the headlease. 
Paragraph 21.3 states: 
Rio Algom Corporation shall, by reason of 
its interest in this Lease as described in 
Section II hereof, be excluded from any 
vote or decision of the Lessors relating to 
royalties and requiring unanimity of the 
Lessors, as provided for in Section 3.2 
hereof. The unanimous vote or decision 
of the remaining Lessors other than Rio 
Algom Corporation shall constitute una-
nimity for the purpose of the said Section 
3.2. [Emphasis added.] 
The Jimco assignment establishes royal-
ties to be paid by Rio to the Jimcos and sets 
payment priorities as between the Audreys 
and the Jimcos. The Jimco assignment pro-
vides in Paragraph X that if uranium con-
centrate is sold, Rio, as assignee of that 
lease, is to pay "earned royalties" to royalty 
interest holders (i.e., the Audreys and Rio 
under the Audrey lease, and the Jimcos 
under the Jimco agreement) according to a 
schedule that provides for payments of be-
tween $% and 15% of the average price per 
pound of U3O8. Once the dollar amount 
thereof has been calculated, Rio is to make 
payments according to the following priori-
ties: 
(i) first, to satisfy the royalty to the 
Lessors in the Head Lease [Audrey 
Lease] . . . in its entirety . . . 
(ii) second, if a balance of Earned Roy-
alty . . . remains after payment of Les-
sors* royalties . . . to pay in their entirety 
the Overriding Royalties . . . 
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(iii) third, // a balance of Earned Roy-
alty .. . remains after payment of the 
Lessors* royalties and Overriding Royal-
ties . . . to pay such balance to JIMCO. 
(Emphasis added). 
The Jimco agreement also establishes a 
ceiling based on the sales price of U308 
which operates to limit Rio's total obliga-
tions under the Audrey and Jimco agree-
ments and gives payment priority to the 
obligation under the Audrey lease in case 
the ceiling is met. If the royalties paid 
under the Audrey lease were based on the 
value of yellowcake, the Jimcos would be 
assured of receiving some royalties; but if 
the royalties were based on a percentage of 
the ore value and that amount equaled or 
exceeded 15% of the yellowcake value, no 
royalties would be owed the Jimcos because 
of the ceiling provision in the Jimco agree-
ment. As long as the Audreys elected roy-
alty payments based on yellowcake price, 
the Jimcos would be assured of receiving 
royalties. However, if the Audreys elected 
a royalty based on the value of crude ore 
and the market value of ore increased sub-
stantially, the Jimcos could be entitled to 
little or no royalties. 
In August J975, the Audrey defendants 
elected to change the royalty payment basis 
in 1976 from the 4% of the yellowcake value 
to 8% of the ore value as permitted by the 
headlease. The Audreys asserted that the 
basis for calculating the royalty should be 
the external fair market value of crude ore, 
unrelated to Rio's production and sale of 
yellowcake, but the Jimcos claimed that the 
royalty basis should be determined by refer-
ence to Rio's actual selling price for yellow-
cake or other uranium products produced 
from the subject properties. Royalties 
based on a higher external market value 
would result in higher payments under the 
Audrey lease and reduce the royalties paid 
to the Jimcos. The Audreys' election of the 
ore value royalty basis thus triggered the 
present dispute. If the Audreys' assertion 
that the royalties should be based on exter-
nal market value were found to be correct, 
the Audreys stood to receive a substantial 
benefit at the Jimcos* expense. 
Rio instituted the present action to re-
solve the question of its royalty obligations 
to the two claimant groups. In its com-
plaint Rio alleged it stood willing and able 
to make royalty payments to the Audreys 
as per the election of the Audreys under the 
headlease and to the Jimcos under the as-
signment of the Jimco lease. Rio paid into 
court amounts representing royalty pay-
ments owed to the defendants and asked 
that the court adjudge the correct basis for 
apportioning the payments between the Au-
dreys and the Jimcos. 
In July 1978, more than two years after 
the commencement of this action and short-
ly before the matter was scheduled to go to 
trial, the Audreys and the Jimcos entered 
into a "settlement agreement" contingent 
upon court approval. Without determining 
whether "fair market value" of the ore 
meant sales price or external market value, 
the defendants agreed as to how the royal-
ties to which they were entitled would be 
distributed as between themselves. The 
Audreys in the settlement agreement per-
manently waived their right to elect under 
Paragraph 3.2 of the amended Audrey lease 
to have Rio pay royalties based on 8% of the 
market value of crude ore. This waiver 
foreclosed the possibility of an election of 
higher royalties to the Audreys and Rio 
under the headlease in the event that a 
royalty based on ore value (calculated with 
reference to external market value) exceed-
ed a royalty based on the yellowcake price. 
The Audreys agreed to make a perma-
nent election of a royalty under the head-
lease based on 4% of yellowcake sales. 
Thus the Audreys were entitled to 3% of 
the sales price of UaOg (after reduction of 
Rio's one-quarter interest) under the Au-
drey lease. The Jimcos, in consideration for 
the Audreys' waiver of the alternate royal-
ty provision under the headlease, assigned 
to the Audreys an additional 2.5% of the 
yellowcake sales price due the Jimcos under 
the Jimco assignment to Rio. This division 
of royalties was to apply retroactively to 
those funds on deposit with the court as 
well as prospectively for the remainder of 
the Audrey lease period. Also, as part of 
RIO ALGOM CORP. v. JIMCO LTD. 
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the agreement, both parties dismissed all 
their claims against each other. 
Rio objected to the settlement stipulation 
because Rio was precluded by that agree-
ment from the possibility of receiving, as a 
co-lessor under the Audrey lease, larger 
royalty payments in the form of (1) royal-
ties tied to the external market value of 
crude ore, because the Audreys had contrac-
tually waived that possible alternative, and 
(2) a share of the 2.5% of royalties received 
by the Audreys as consideration for their 
waiver. 
In view of Rio's objections to the settle-
ment stipulation, the agreement was ex-
pressly made subject to a court ruling that 
Rio was legally precluded from challenging 
its implementation and that the stipulation 
did not violate any duty owed to Rio by any 
of the defendants. A motion was filed 
seeking the requisite court ruling. Rio filed 
objections to the proposed settlement stipu-
lation and also filed an amended complaint 
wherein it asserted that the stipulation con-
stituted, among other things, tortious inter-
ference with its contract rights, a breach of 
fiduciary duties owed to it, and a violation 
of its contract rights. The trial court ruled 
in favor of the defendants and approved the 
terms of their agreement. Rio's amended 
complaint was dismissed for failure to state 
a cause of action. 
On appeal Rio contends that the Audreys' 
waiver of election rights violated Rio's 
rights under the amended Audrey lease. 
Specifically, the issue is whether the Au-
drey defendants have the right to enter into 
an agreement permanently revoking, for 
consideration, the election rights provided 
in Paragraph 3.2 of the amended Audrey 
4. Rio is entitled to 25% of the royalties paid 
pursuant to the Audrey lease ('A of the 4% of 
yellowcake sales royalty). However, its per-
centage is only 15.3% of the Audreys' and 
Rio's total royalties, including the additional 
2.5% to be paid only to the Audreys by the 
Jimcos under the settlement agreement. 
5. The claim of modification of the Rio-Jimco 
lease is based on that leases embodiment of 
the terms of the amended Audrey lease as they 
apply to Jimco's tenancy rights and obligations 
which were assigned to Rio. It is therefore 
lease without violating Rio's contractual 
rights. Rio's position is that the settlement 
stipulation effects material changes in its 
contractual agreements with the Audreys 
under the Audrey lease and with the Jimcos 
under the Jimco agreement. 
Rio acknowledges that the amended Au-
drey lease expressly excluded Rio from par-
ticipation in the royalty election decision, 
but Rio asserts that the Audreys were 
barred from making an election that was 
not beneficial to Rio because of an implied 
covenant of good faith and an asserted fi-
duciary duty that one cotenant owes anoth-
er cotenant. Rio argues that it is harmed 
by receiving a smaller proportion of the 
total royalties to be received by the Audrey 
lessors as a result of the settlement agree-
ment 4 and that this fact constitutes a modi-
fication of the Audrey and Jimco leases 
without its concurrence.5 Also, the Au-
dreys, by abandoning the position that their 
royalties under the headlease should be 
based on external fair market value of ore, 
have permanently precluded Rio from the 
possibility of sharing in the consequences of 
that potentially more lucrative formula.* 
Rio relies on the general proposition that 
the terms of a contract cannot be modified 
without the consent of all the parties. Mai-
strom v. Consolidated Theaters, 4 Utah 2d 
181, 290 P.2d 689 (1955), Western Airlines v. 
Hollenbeck, 124 Colo. 130, 235 P.2d 792 
(1951). The Audreys and the Jimcos, on the 
other hand, deny that their agreement con-
stitutes a modification of the leases in ques-
tion. 
[1] To determine whether the Audrey 
defendants effected a modification of the 
unnecessary' to deal separately with the effect 
oi the stipulation on the Jimco lease. 
6. Since Rio's contract with Duke Power provid-
ed for a yellowcake sales price which the par-
ties contend was below that of the prevailing 
market price at the time this dispute arose, a 
royalty based on external fair market value 
would increase cotenant Rio's royalty share as 
lessor/payee and not result in a greater obliga-
tion as lessee/payor because of the limit on 
maximum royalties payable in the Jimco con-
tract. 
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Audrey lease and violated a duty owed to 
Rio, we look to the language of the amend-
ed Audrey lease as it pertains to royalty 
rights. The election option provided in 
Paragraph 3.2 is set out in pertinent part 
above. The Audreys' right to waive that 
election without Rio's concurrence is clearly 
authorized by Paragraph 21.3 of the Audrey 
lease. That provision states that Rio "shall 
be excluded from any vote or decision 
of the lessors relating to royalties." Be-
cause of the inherent conflict of interest 
created by Rio's position as both payor and 
payee of royalties, the exclusive right to 
exercise the option was conferred on the 
Audreys. Rio had no contractual right with 
respect to the election process. According-
ly, we view the Audrey-Jimco agreement 
simply as a waiver of a right possessed by 
the Audreys. That waiver did not consti-
tute a modification of the headlease or a 
violation of any rights that Rio had there-
under. 
[2] By the Audreys' waiving the option 
election and agreeing to accept the yellow-
cake sales basis for the royalties payable 
under the Audrey lease, a new royalty has 
not been created.7 One of the choices avail-
able to the Audreys-clearly permissible un-
der the terms of the Audrey lease-has been 
selected on a permanent basis. Under the 
express terms of Paragraph 3.2 an election 
once made is effective for each year there-
after unless and until expressly revoked by 
the Audrey defendants. A permanent elec-
tion is no different in effect than an elec-
tion made pursuant to the lease agreement 
without a subsequent revocation. Rio had 
no legal right to challenge either such an 
election or a refusal to revoke an election. 
[3] Nor has Rio any right to challenge 
the Audrey-Jimco agreement. The Au-
dreys' agreement with the Jimcos is a con-
tract separate and apart from the Audrey 
lease. The Jimcos assigned a benefit they 
had under the Rio-Jimco agreement in re-
turn for the relinquishment of a contract 
right by the Audreys. Even though that 
7. The royalties payable by Rio have not been 
increased or made subject to a formula differ-
ent from that provided by the lease. Nor has 
agreement affects the option election of the 
Audrey lease, Rio, by virtue of having 
agreed to the exclusion from the decision as 
to how royalties should be determined, has 
no standing to challenge the Audrey-Jimco 
agreement. The Audreys had every right 
to exercise that option as they pleased. As 
stated in 3 Corbin on Contracts § 564 at 293 
(1960), "[WJhere the parties have made an 
express contract, the court should not find a 
different one by implication' concerning 
the same subject matter if the evidence 
does not justify [such] an interference 
While Rio may receive a smaller royalty 
payment under an election made by the 
Audrey group, that result is clearly contem-
plated by the terms of the Audrey lease. 
The cotenants still share proportionally in 
the royalty payments made pursuant to the 
Audrey lease, i.e., 4% of the value of yellow-
cake is distributed one-fourth (or 1%) to 
Rio and three-fourths (or 3%) to the Au-
dreys. 
Rio analogizes its "nonvoting" status to 
the position of an owner of nonvoting cor-
porate stock, who, though precluded from 
voting, retains property interests in the 
stock which should be protected by those 
who own voting shares. Rio contends it 
was illegally deprived of the potential bene-
fits of the annual option being permanently 
waived by the Audreys. Rio's position is 
that the Audreys were not entitled to sell 
that option right without the consent of all 
lessors, including Rio. 
[4,5] The analogy to nonvoting stock-
holders does not hold. Generally, owners of 
voting corporate stock have the right to 
vote their stock as they please and are not 
obligated to defer to the interests of minori-
ty stockholders. Majority stockholders are 
subject only to the restriction that they 
may not vote their stock for the purpose of 
oppressing or defrauding the minority 
stockholders. Ritchie v. McGrath, 1 Kan. 
App.2d 481, 571 P.2d 17 (1977); 5 Fletcher, 
Rio's share of royalty payments been altered, 
although 2 5% of the royalties due the Jimcos 
have been assigned to the Audreys. 
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§ 2025 (1976). But there is no oppressive or 
fraudulent conduct in the defendant's ig-
noring the interest of Rio after Rio had 
expressly disclaimed the right to vote on a 
matter where there was an obvious conflict 
of interest and where recognition of the 
power to vote would have given a veto 
power over the choice of the manner of 
determining royalty payments. 
[6-11] Rio contends that the settlement 
stipulation breaches an implied covenant of 
good faith. It is fundamental that, wheth-
er expressed or not, every contract includes 
a covenant of good faith with respect to 
dealings between the parties. The parties 
to a contract must deal fairly and honestly 
with each other. Fischer v. Johnson, Utah, 
525 P.2d 45 (1974); Flying Tiger Line, Inc. 
v. United States Aircoach, 51 Cal.2d 199, 
331 ?2d 37 (1958); 3 Corbin on Contracts 
§ 541 (1960). A court will not, however, 
make a better contract for the parties than 
they have made for themselves. J. R. Sim-
plot Co. v. Chambers, 82 Idaho 104, 350 P.2d 
211 (1960). An express agreement or cove-
nant relating to a specific contract right 
excludes the possibility of an implied cove-
nant of a different or contradictory nature. 
Brimmer v. Union Oil Co. of California, 81 
F.2d 437 (10th Cir. 1936); Hartman Ranch 
Co. v. Associated Oil Co., 10 Cal.2d 232, 73 
P.2d 1163 (1937); 20 Am.Jur.2d Covenants, 
Conditions, and Restrictions § 12 (1965). 
Because of Rio's dual role, the Audreys 
were not required to subordinate their own 
interests to Rio's in making their election. 
A duty of good faith does not mean that a 
party vested with a clear right is obligated 
to exercise that right to its own detriment 
for the purpose of benefiting another party 
to the contract. A court will not enforce 
asserted rights that are not supported by 
the contract itself. In re Cohen's Estate, 23 
Ill.App.2d 411, 163 N.E.2d 533 (1960). 
[12] It may be true that a royalty based 
on the value of yellowcake could result in a 
lesser total royalty payment under the 
headlease and that the 2.5% payment to the 
Audreys under the Jimco agreement would 
increase the Audreys* total receipts without 
in the augmented 
amount as it would do if the larger amount 
were paid under the terms of the Audrey 
lease, but the settlement agreement had a 
valid purpose, and we are not able to con-
clude that the 2.5% payment to the Audreys 
(and excluding Rio) constituted bad faith or 
an effort to exclude Rio from its rightful 
share of the royalties. Had the Jimcos 
agreed to pay a lump sum to the Audreys in 
return for the Audreys' agreement to exer-
cise its election in a particular manner, it 
seems even plainer that Rio would not be 
entitled to participate in the lump sum. 
Yet the two situations are essentially com-
parable. 
The clear implication of the election pro-
vision was that the Audreys had the right 
to exercise that right in their own self-in-
terest. The settlement stipulation does not 
deprive Rio of royalties to which it is enti-
tled under the terms of the Audrey lease. 
The Audreys waived their right to revoke 
their royalty election to settle lengthy and 
costly litigation over the disposition of roy-
alty payments. The consideration paid to 
them was not for an interest in mining 
claims or other property in which Rio was a 
co-owner with the Audreys. There is no 
evidence of bad faith on the Audreys' part. 
In settlement of a costly and time-con-
suming legal dispute, the Audreys relin-
quished an option they alone had the right 
to assert in exchange for an assignment of 
a portion of royalties payable to the Jimcos. 
The Audreys had the right to bargain with 
respect to their exclusive option, and the 
Jimcos* right to make an assignment of 
royalties to the Audreys in return for relin-
quishing a legal right is beyond dispute. 
There is no greater royalty burden placed 
upon Rio as lessee. Its payments to the 
Jimcos are payable only after the Audreys 
and Rio as cotenants have received the pay-
ments due them. The royalty ceiling 
agreed to in the Jimco lease remains the 
same. 
[13] Rio's lA undivided ownership inter-
est in the mineral claims stands apart from 
the option election vested in the Audreys. 
The Audreys* agreement to exercise the 
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option in a particular manner was for the 
purpose of settling litigation between them 
and the Jimcos. It is basic that the law 
favors settlements of disputes, Tracy-Col-
lins Bank & Trust Co. v. Travelstead, Utah, 
592 P.2d 605 (1979); Williams v. First Na-
tional Bank of Pauls Valley, 216 U.S. 582, 
30 S.Ct. 441, 54 L.Ed. 625 (1910); and under 
the circumstances of this case in which the 
approval of the trial court was a necessary 
predicate of the settlement, we are not able 
to perceive any element of bad faith. 
Rio argues further that it is an intended 
beneficiary of the election provision of the 
amended Audrey lease, even though exer-
cised by others, because it participates in 
the outcome of the royalty election, and 
that those holding the power of election are 
obligated to exercise that power to protect 
Rio's interests. Rio cites as authority cases 
dealing with the question of the right of 
one not a party to an agreement to enforce 
rights under that agreement as a third-par-
ty beneficiary, viz., Montgomery v. Rief, 
Spencer and Dee, 15 Utah 495, 50 P. 623 
(1897); Manning v. Wiscombe, 498 F.2d 
1311 (10th Cir. 1974); and Hamill v. Mary-
land Cas. Co., 209 F.2d 338 (10th Cir. 1954). 
[14-16] However, the argument is not 
sound. Third-party beneficiaries are "per-
sons who are recognized as having enforce-
able rights created in them by a contract to 
which they are not parties and for which 
they give no consideration," 4 Corbin on 
Contracts § 774 at 6 (1960). See Mason v. 
Tooele City, 26 Utah 2d 6, 484 P.2d 153 
(1971). For a third-party beneficiary to 
have a right to enforce a right, the inten-
tion of the contracting parties to confer a 
separate and distinct benefit upon the third 
party must be clear. Clark v. American 
Standard, Inc., Utah, 583 P.2d 618 (1978). 
A third-party beneficiary who is incidental-
ly benefited may not recover. Montgomery 
v. Rief, et al, supra; California Cotton Oil 
Corp. v. Rabb, 88 Ariz. 375, 357 P.2d 126 
(1960). There is nothing in the Audrey 
lease which indicates any intention on the 
part of the contracting parties to confer 
upon Rio any right to control the exercise 
of the option or to have it exercised in favor 
of Rio's self-interest; indeed, the contract 
evidences the exact opposite intent. Cer-
tainly Rio is entitled to no greater rights, 
even viewing it as a third-party benefi-
ciary, than it has as an actual party. Conti-
nental Bank & Trust Co. v. Stewart, 4 Utah 
2d 228, 291 P.2d 890 (1955). 
Rio also contends that the Audrey de-
fendants, in entering into the settlement 
agreement with the Jimcos, breached fidu-
ciary duties owed to Rio. Those duties are 
asserted to exist both by reason of the 
status of Rio and the Audreys as cotenants 
of the subject uranium claims and because 
of the effects upon Rio of the exercise of 
the Audreys' option election. 
[17] In some situations a fiduciary rela-
tionship may exist between tenants in com-
mon. But the mere fact of cotenancy alone 
does not create such a relationship. 4A 
Powell on Real Property § 605 at 619 (1979). 
In Pure Oil Co. v. Byrnes, 388 111. 26, 57 
N.E.2d 356, 361 (1944), the court held that a 
fiduciary relationship existed between the 
parties, but stated: 
A fiduciary relationship did not arise 
merely from the fact that appellant and 
appellee were tenants in common.... 
Ordinarily one tenant in common may 
deal with a cotenant respecting the com-
mon property. Albrecht v. Hunecke, 196 
111. 127, 63 N.E. 616, 618. But this court, 
in the case just cited, said: "The question 
whether there is a fiduciary relation be-
tween such parties, so that confidence is 
reposed by one in the other, will depend 
upon all the facts and circumstances of 
the particular case." 
[18] A fiduciary relationship between 
cotenants is usually found when one coten-
ant of real property undertakes to act on 
behalf of another cotenant or takes advan-
tage of other cotenants, often in the course 
of acquiring paramount title or ousting oth-
er cotenants. In Britton v. Green, 325 F.2d 
377 (10th Cir. 1963), one cotenant agreed to 
become the operating agent for others to 
"exploit the co-tenancy for their mutual 
profit." The court held that the cotenant 
with a right to possess the property owed 
fiduciary duties to its cotenants not in pos-
session. 
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Rio argues that Britton is applicable to 
this case, but the facts are distinguishable. 
In Britton the court stated: 
It is agreed that seller shall have active 
charge of the operation of said leasehold 
estate, and that said premises shall be 
operated to the mutual interest of all 
parties hereto as economically as good 
business judgment will warrant. It is 
further agreed that the parties hereto 
will observe the spirit as well as the strict 
letter of this contract and work at all 
times to the mutual advantage of each 
other in the management and operation 
and development of said lease. 325 F.2d 
at 381 n. 2. [Emphasis added.] 
[19] In contrast, recognition of an obli-
gation on the part of the Audrey defend-
ants to exercise their contractual election 
right in the best interests of Rio would be 
at odds with the purpose for, and intent of, 
Paragraph 21.3 of the Audrey lease. That 
provision expressly vests the royalty elec-
tion solely in the Audreys and excludes Rio 
from any decision in that election. The 
obvious purpose was to prevent, at the 
least, conflict, and at the worst, injury to 
the Audreys, because of Rio's conflict of 
interest. The amended Audrey lease was 
not designed to give Rio the best possible of 
all worlds which might result from Rio's 
status as a recipient of the same royalties 
which Rio itself paid, a possibility that ex-
isted because Rio paid and received those 
royalties in different proportions. The par-
ties foresightedly dealt with this conflict 
when the Audrey lease was executed. In 
short, we hold that the Audreys owed no 
fiduciary duty to Rio with respect to the 
election option. 
[20] Rio's final argument is that the 
trial court erred in dismissing its amended 
complaint for failure to state a cause of 
action. The amended complaint based its 
claims both on Rio's asserted contractual 
rights and the cotenancy status of Rio and 
the Audreys. Rio argues that the trial 
court should have allowed it to conduct 
discovery and present evidence on its claims 
of breach of fiduciary duties. 
Neither the amended Audrey lease nor 
the nature of the relationship between Rio 
and the Audreys imposed fiduciary duties 
upon the Audreys in their dealings with Rio 
beyond an implied covenant to exercise 
their contractual rights in good faith. 
Since the settlement stipulation was not in 
violation of Rio's contractual rights or of 
any fiduciary duty, the amended complaint 
was properly dismissed. 
In sum, we affirm the trial court's order 
sustaining the validity of the Jimco-Audrey 
settlement stipulation. 
Costs to Respondents. 
CROCKETT, C. J., and MAUGHAN, 
WILKINS and HALL, JJ., concur. 
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A certification order shall be pVepared by the 
certifying court/ signed by the judgeXpresiding over 
the proceeding/giving rise to the certification order, 
and forwarded to the Utah Supreme yourt by the 
clerk of the Certifying court under iuW&ciai seal. 
The Court, m its discretion, may then Yequire that 
certified copies of all or any portion of\ the record 
before the ratifying court be filed with this Court 
if, in the/opinion of this Court, the record or a 
portion thereof may be necessary in determining 
whether to accept the certified question or so answ-
ering thai question. 
(e) Acceptance or RejeclkMi of Certificate*. 
Upon filing of the certification order and 
mpanring papers with the Clerk, the Court >haH 
promptly enter an order either accepting or n 
the iuestion certified to it, and the Clerk shall 
reuaon serve copies of tins Court's order upon 
iifying court and all parties identified in the 
tification order. If the Court accepts the questk 
for adjudication, the Court will set out in the ort 
if acceptance (i) the specific question or questiori 
ted, (ii) those portions of the record wh/th 
be copied and filed with the Clerk ofy 
CoWt, and (ui) a schedule for the filing of friers 
andVor oral argument by the parties. The form of 
briefi\and proceedings on oral argument shall ther-
eafter ^be governed by Rules 21 and 40/of these 
rules. It\may be presumed that the Coup will give 
the matte\expedited treatment. 
(OFtea. 
The fees fVr filing an order of certification in this 
Court shall be\the same as for filing ind docketing a 
notice of appeal in a civil appeal in the Court, and 
the cost shall beXequally divided between the parties 
to the cause unJe^ otherwise ordered by the certif-
ying court in its oraer of certification. 
(g) Aseodetioa of ( 
Upon acceptance b i the Court of the question of 
law presented by the certification order, counsel for 
the parties not licensed \ o practice law in the state 
of Utah shall associate/smember in good standing 
of the Utah State Bar in connection with all further 
proceedings before the/Court\ 
(a) Iasaaace of Optatoa oa Certified Qeestiow. 
The Court will issue a written, opinion that will be 
published and reported. A copy W the opinion shall 
be transmitted Vy the Clerk under the seal of the 
Court to the certifying court and 0} the parties ide-
ntified in the certification order. 
TITLE VK JURISDICTION ON WRIT OF 
CERTIORARI TO COURT OF APPEALS 
RULE/2. REVIEW OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, 
AND DECREES OF COURT OF APPE 
Unless otherwise provided by law, the review of a 
judgment, an order, and a decree (herein referred to 
"decisions") of the Court of Appeals shall be 
itiated by a petition for a writ of certiorari to i 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
RULE 43. CONSIDERATIONS GOVERNING 
REVIEW OF CERTIORARI 
Review by a writ of certiorari is not a matter of 
right, but of judicial discretion, and will be granted 
only when there are special and important reasons 
therefor. The following, while neither controlling 
nor wholly measuring the Court's discretion, indi-
cate the character of reasons that will be considered: 
(1) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has 
rendered a decision in conflict with a decision of 
another panel of the Court of Appeals on the same 
issue of law; 
(2) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has 
decided a question of state or federal law in a way 
that is in conflict with a decision of this Court; 
(3) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has 
rendered a decision that has so far departed from 
the accepted and usual course of judicial proceed-
ings or has so far sanctioned such a departure by a 
lower court as to call for an exercise of this Court's 
power of supervision; or 
(4) When the Court of Appeals has decided an 
important question of municipal, state, or federal 
law which has not been, but should be, settled by 
this Court. 
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 D.;,MyC"-
Craig G. Adamson (0024) 
Attorney for Defendant 
310 South Main, Suite 1330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 521-6383 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TKii THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
VIVIAN M. SCUELLER, et al. 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DIXIE SIX CORPORATION, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Ci\il No. CB3-6862 
Judge Dean E. Condor 
oooOooo 
This matter came on for trial before the Honorable Dean 
E. Condor on the 10th day of May, 1985, and was concluded on the 
same day. Plaintiffs were represented by Walter P. Faber, their 
attorney of record. Defendant was represented by Craig G. 
Adamson, its attorney of record. The trial proceeded and each of 
the parties produced witnesses, introduced exhibits, and made 
argument in support of their various contentions. The court, at 
the conclusion of the testimony, requested that- counsel present 
memoranda to the court by May 24, 1985,
 %* with responsive memoranda 
due $n Maj 31, 1985. Counsel complied with the court's request 
anTI the court having now had an opportunity to review the file, 
hear the testimony and argument and review the memoranda 
submitted by counsel, and being fully informed in the matter now 
makes and enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The parties to this action are the partners in a 
Utah Limited Partnership known and identified as D.S.T., Ltd. 
Plaintiffs are the limited partners and defendant is the general 
partner. 
2. The agreement creating the partnership was signed 
on March 3, 1980. Prior to that time Mrs* Scheller, on behalf of 
the limited partners and various of the representatives of the 
general partner, had had conversations concerning the formation 
of the partnership* The first such conversation was in the 
spring of 1979 between Mrs, Scheller and Hal Larsen. Thereafter, 
Mrs* Scheller and Mr* Larsen met on the site oi the property 
finally contributed to the partnership by the limited partners 
and discussed the possibility of forming a limited partnership, 
Mrs. Scheller and Mr. Larsen discussed possible types and 
configurations of buildings which might fit on the land. 
Thereafter, Mrs. Scheller met with six of the members of the 
defendant and discussed a partnership. At that time she was 
given a copy of an old partnership agreement which Dixie Six had 
entered into previously. 
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3. After the conclusion ol the meeting with the Dixie 
Six members, Mrs. Schellor took the partnership agreement given 
to her by Dixie Six to Janes Arrowsmith, her attorney. 
4. The final aprreement creating the partnership was 
drafted by James Arrowsmith, Mrs. Scheller's attorney, at that 
time a member of the firm of Watkins & Faber. Parts of the final 
agreement came from the previous Dixie Six partnership document 
provided to Mrs. Scheller and the remainder of the agreement was 
provided by Mr. Arrowsmith without contact with defendant. 
Mr. Arrowsmith made changes in the prior agreement to bring the 
final agreement into conformity with the form of such agreements 
in use in their office at that time. 
5. A portion of the agreement which was copied from 
the previous agreement is the purpose clause, which is found at 
Article II of the agreement. That paragraph states that the 
purpose and character of the business is to subdivide, develop 
and market certain real property located in Salt Lake County, 
Utah. The terms subdivide, develop and market are not defined in 
the partnership agreement^ arKi^frere^*^^^^^ 
t ime^^^^qiii^4-f^_tuh e-^eaxiriii—pax t ^ T ^ O L jle&^op^tb^^t^iizX^t o 
^n^._pafTlt>uJLar--tHag^^oHr^lTT "~any~4}a£-H^uXiiii-4?m-fTffer b£^jiL£-Jiia£k#t i ng 
6. Paragraph 15.3 of the agreement creating the 
partnership was added to the agreement by Mr. Arrowsmith. That 
3 
agreement provides in relevant part: 
"The limited partners hereby consent 
to any sale or other d±.F posi tion, encumber -
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as 
may be determined by Dixie? 
7. During the term of the partnership the general 
partner engaged several experts and spent significant amounts of 
its own time and advanced its own money in preparing plans, plats 
and studies and in gaining governmental approval for the building 
of an apartment and commercial complex on the site. 
8. At the time the general partner completed its plans 
for improvements for the site during the fall of 1982, it 
attempted to find financing to build the project as designed, but 
was unable to find financing at a rate which it believed 
appropriate in light of the depressed real estate market in the 
area during that period of time, 
9. During the period of the partnership the general 
partner entered into sales and contracts for sale of the 
partnership property as follows: 
a. A sale to Hendrickson in April of 1981; 
b. A sale to Hendrickson in February of 1982; 
c. A proposed sale to P. F. West of all of the 
remaining propertj in the partnership in the fall of 1982; 
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d. A sale of all of tho remaining partnership propert> 
to Busch Development on June 30, 1983, 
10. The limited partners knew of, consented to and 
participated by signing documents for the two sales to 
Hendrickson; they were aware of and, through Mrs, wScheller, 
specifically consented to the proposed sale to P. F. West, which 
was not consummated. They were aware of the sale to Busch 
Development on substantially the same terms as the proposed sale 
to P. F. West. The plaintiffs did not, in any case, object to 
the right of the general partner to sell the property of the 
partnership. Plaintiffs' only objection to any of the sales was 
with respect to the Busch sale and was an objection to the 
division of the proceeds generated by the sale. 
11. In the case of each of the actual sales, the 
plaintiffs have accepted the limited partner's share of the funds 
generated by the sale and in no case did tho limited partners 
challenge the right of the general partner to make sale, even 
though they knew that the condition of the property at the time 
of each'sale was materially different from the concept of 
developed property which plaintiff Scheller said she originally 
had in mind for the property in which the plaintiffs urge upon 
thus-court. In each case, the land sold was vacant and no 
additional on-site improvements had been added during the term of 
the partnership. 
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12. The agreement of the parties provides that monies 
from the sale of the partnership properties is to be divided as 
follows: 
(1) Repayment to the general partner of costs as per 
billings submitted by the general partner. 
(2) Return of the limited partner's contribution to 
the partnership with a value thereof to be cal-
culated at $30,000.00 per useable acre. 
(3) The remainder to be divided equally between the 
parties. 
The general partner may also receive as i cost a real 
estate commission of up to s^ x percent (6%) of the sales price of 
the partnership property. The general partner's right to do this 
was acknowledged by the plaintiffs in their complaint. The 
general partner has waived its right to the commission on the 
sales to Henarickson and has not yet received the sales 
commission on the sale to Busch. 
13. From the furid^  generated by sales of the 
partnership property, the general partner has received payment of 
its actual out-of-pocket costs billed tp date, but has received 
no-sales commissions. The limited partners have received 
$7.09,842.04 av a return of their contribution and have received 
$205,189.99 toward their --hare of prjfits, for a total of 
6 
$915,032.03. The general partner has established a partnership 
account in which it has retained $206,050.00. It had withdrawn 
nothing from that account for payment of real estate commission 
or profit at th3 request of plaintiffs* counsel, pending a 
decision of this court, 
14. When all of the funds generated by all of the 
sales are considered, the property contributed by the plaintiffs 
at an agreed upon value of $30,000.00 per acre has been sold, 
together with governmental approvals, plats, plans, drawings and 
occupancy permits provided by the plaintiffs for the sum of 
$1,262,500.00, together with accruing interest on the balance 
remaining. 
15. The plats, plans, occupancy permits and other 
reports, studies and governmental approvals secured by the 
general partners were sold with the land and were at least a part 
of the reason for the increase in value of the partnership 
property from $30,000.00 per acre to $55,000.00 per acre. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact the court now makes 
and enters the following, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAff 
1. The agreement of the parties does not define the 
words subdivide, develop and market and the actions of the 
defendant general partner in selling the property as it did does 
not violate the agreement of the parties. 
7 
2. The provisions of the partnership agreement 
regarding payment of the general partner are not inequitable 
under the facts of this case. 
3. The plaintiffs have, with full knowledge, 
acquiesced, and in fact, approved of the sales of the property by 
the general partner in the manner provided for in paragraph 15.3 
of the agreement creating the partnership and in direct 
contravention of the position which they urge upon the court that 
the property could not be sold by the general partner unless it 
was developed in a manner which the plaintiffs have failed to 
specifically prove. 
4. It would be inequitable to allow the plaintiffs to 
accept the fruits of the laborb of the defendant without allowing 
the defendant to recover as provided in the contract. 
5. Plaintiffs are estopped by their own actions from 
taking the position that the defendant has not performed as 
provided in the contract. 
6. The services of the defendant herein have been of 
value and it would be inequitable to allow the limited partners 
to profit from the efforts of the general partner without 
allowing the general partner to profit at the same time. 
7. No evidence has been presented to the court as to 
any alternative method of compensating the general partner and 
8 
the court concludes that the method of compensating the general 
partner for its services set forth in the agreement creating the 
partnership is equitable and appropriate and should be followed. 
DATED this / & nay of June, 1985. 
BY THE COURT: 
Dean K, Conder 
District Judge 
<U-
'<X 
COVE 
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Craig G. Adamson (0024) 
Attorney for Defendant 
310 South Mam, Suite 1330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
By' /tyl£f~$lU. <-Ji£6^^ 
D *. ' / C'CfK 
J U D G M E N T 
Civil No. C83-6862 
Judge Dean E. Conder 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
VIVIAN M. SCHELLER, et al, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DIXIE SIX CORPORATION", 
Defendant. 
oooOooo 
This matter came on for trial before the Honorable Dean 
E. Conder, a judge of the above-entitied court on the 10th day of 
May, 19S5, and was eonelOded on the same day. Plaintiffs were 
represented by Walter P. Faber, their attorney of record. 
Defendant was represented by Craig G. Adamson, its attorney of 
record. Trial proceeded and the parties each provided testimony, 
submitted documents and made argument to the court in support of 
their positions. Counsel for pach of the parties has also 
submitted memoranda as requested by the court and the court has 
reviewed the memoranda and the file. The court being fully 
acjvi^d in the matter has issued its memorandum opinion and has 
made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
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The court now being fully advised and good cause appearing 
therefor, 
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGhD AND DECRFFD: 
1. The limited partnership between the parties 
continues in force under its specific written terms, 
2. The defendant general partner is ordered to 
continue to collect and to distribute the funds from the sale of 
the property of the partnership as provided in Article IX of the 
agreement of the parties with the first monies applied to payment 
to general partner for sums due under paragraph 9.2 and 9.3 of 
the agreement of the parties* 
3. Plaintiffs' complaint for declaratory judgment is 
denied. 
4. Defendant is auaided its costs herein. 
DATED this / £ day of Juno, 1985. 
BY THE COUHT: 
Dean ^. render 
District Judge 
2 
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"7-. 
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP AGRKKHKNT 
AGRKEHENT made this _ ^ 'lay of October, lt76f by 
and between DIXIE SIX CORPORATION, a Utah corporation, horaLnafter 
< f//V'.t*/ ^ Scke//e Z 
referred to aa •Dixie,* and VI RNON B. CLIrtTON, of the County of 
&*/? IxXe
 c t/tfA sale/A*K 
Twi.n Pa 34s, State of Idaho, hereinafter referred to as •eiintori." 
WHEREAS, Clinton owrs, free of any lien* or encumbrance? 
a tract of land in the .County >f Salt T.afce, State of Utsh, said 
tract hereinafter referred to w. \ he "Property,• more particularly 
described on Exhibit •A* att«i«*iir»<| horeio and by reference »ade a 
part l*ereoi, such ProjMM ty stniM.li' for *nl*Ji vi::ton ami develop-
ment
 f and 
WHEREAS, Dixie has the ex|* nence, personnel*and 
equipment necessary for the* f1ev<>1f»ijiiH nt of the Jroporty, and 
Sc t*e>//ee 
WHEREAS, Dixie and Cl^rrton desire to form a Limited. 
Partnership for tie development and sale of the Property according 
to |he terms of this Agreement* 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants 
herein, the parties agrc* as follows: 
*• Scope and Desrr J** on. The? part JOE hereby create 
a Limited Partnership pursuant to the provisions of the statutes 
of Utah for the purpose of sut ividi 19, developing, and marketing 
the Property. The Limited Par nershtp shall be operated under 
Sthe//e£ 
the name of "Dixie Six and CI* ton* /ith the principal office 
A • . 'Z » i ' % w • 
thereof at W J 5 H c i f J W S o n t i , Cit ' of Salt Lake, County of 
Salt Lake, State cf Utah. 
7• Term. The Part icn.hip shall commence on the date 
hereof and shall continue until the* 31st day of December, 1977, ' 
and thereafter fr<m year to y sr unless terminated or dissolved 
as hereinafter pre vided. 
• *«* •«• »•< r #»*• 
MPTTAT. W r U H O r**l'l«.iW a UtffMINCMAM 
• tM rt> <m rmmu*«r * U I U > I M O 
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3. O^rJbul ions ^uf Partners. Dixie shall be the 
General Partner «»f the Limited Partnership and Clinton shall be 
stke//*/tr 
the l i m i t e d Part; or of t i e Partnership. Clinton agrees t o con-
t r i b u t e the Prop rty to he c a p i t a / o f the Partnership with the 
Property being valued for purf>nscs of such contr ibut ion a t the 
sum of $74$> W«i„:94. Dixie sh<i1l contr ibute i t s e x p e r t i s e for 
the purpose of subdividing, developing, and marketing the 
Property; s h a l l >rovide or obtain a l l equipment, machinery and 
personnel necessary for such r.uMi v i s i o n , cleveJoj »^nt and marketing 
and s h a l l fur!.he obtain the fiorcr:.s«try find s u f f i c i e n t f inancing 
for such subclivi :inn, *levolo|*i»rrit .iri<1 m;irk'*rf n«j, using the 
Property or. sccu i t y t l n v c f o r . 
4. G nduct_oi Partnership. On the date hereof, 
Cl inton s h a l l convey the Property to the Partnership by Warranty 
Deed. I t i s understood by the p a r t i e s that the Property nhal l 
be u t i l i z e d by the Partnership to obtain a loan, the proceeds 
thereof to be used for the subd iv i s i on , development and marketing 
of the Property by Dix i e . 
marketing the P iraer ty , the s a l e s pr i ce of the Property s h a l l be 
the sun of $16,75uvO(T>er acre . The terms- ang^ronditions of 
such s a l e s s h a l l generally^jH^yide for^a^poVn payment o f t i n 
percent (10%) of the s a l e s pri rc>>K^h/fhe balance, together with 
i n t e r e s t a t the ra te of eiqb*T >ercent ( H i per annum, t o be paid 
a t the r a t e of one perjsent XXX per month of the^orig inal o u t -
standing b a l a n c e ^ i r ^^Tive (5 year period with t h e r e M i n i n g 
I aAanp'? due^iTd p. /able at the cm! of such f ive (S) yeai p n 
Mot At. W C L L I I ; . r * u i f N ft DUMMIMCMAM 
• 1 H U C I TfilOHN ftUILDING 
%4> • U1H WAII MTfltn 
SALT LA> .i CITY. • TAM 04111 
'-*?.««> 
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5. Division of Monies R«»roiy3cl. M l fsonfos received 
from the sale of the Property .sh.ill !*• *«llf»cat<HJ *m follows 
(a) First, to thf KHJ.I] r*xpon*cs of tho Partner-
ship or D)x:t rclai ivo io the development and improve-
ment of tie Property, s» eh expenses to be itemize*! on 
the monthly stat«*mMit p ovided to Chfrttton. 
(b) SoconcJ, to th return to Ciintcn of liia-
capital contribution in the r.um of $740,f?8.94. 
(c) Third, to Dix o nnd Clinton m*it /illy. 
*• Salaries and Drowi y Account. No snlary shall.be 
paid to any Partner. Mo drawing tcrrount *hall be ftntabl iahed 
for any Partner unli-Lt; ami until ••!! tiflu.il r*xf*«fi:;c»N of devilop~ 
stent and improvement have been paid .*tn<! fcliwfcsn has been returned 
his capital contribution* 
?• Managementt Duties and restrictions. During *he 
period of the Partnership, the rights and liabilities of Dixie,' 
Scrfe//ec hereinafter referred to as the ftcn»>ral Partner and Clfnton, 
hereinafter referred to as the L mi tod Partner, shall be ar 
follows: 
(a) Ceneral Pnrtt.rr. 
(1) The Gem ral Partner shall obtain the 
necessary financing for the subdivision, dexalop-
aent, and improvement of the Property. 
(2) The Gem ral Partner shall keep all 
A 
financial records of the Partnership at ff 
" 5 0 0 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 8U20\ Such 
< 
books ai.d records shall be available for inspection 
^a©* 
M< rAV. WaUINft , PAUI M M t UOMMtMOMAM 
•TM rxoo* rnttwmr. »uit.otN<* 
143 fcOUTM MAIN t t ^ t t T 
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•by «iny J\*irtn«»r at .my liw^. Mrlii inn/illy, ^ be 
Gcn<»i .il InrtiMT ::ha11 provide to tho Limited 
Partner, on .i monthly bar. is, a s tat #»«cnt of 
information as to the progress of the Partnership, 
(3) The General Partner shall bc« exclusively 
responsible for all functions relative* to the 
subdivision, development, and improvement of the 
Property inclu'»in«j obtaining all permits and 
agroeme .ts roq iirt»d in connection therewith. 
Such sultdivi.iion, development, and improvement of 
«hr Pre *Tty r.hall ijrn'*r«illy be in accordance 
1th the pl.it map ai t .ic-hcvi hereto us Exhibit "B* 
nd by reference ma«le a part hereof. 
(4) The General Partner shall be exclusively 
responsible for the marketing of the Property. 
(b) Limited Partner. The Limited Partner shall 
not participate in management. There shall be no 
additional limited partners admitted into the Partna 
ship without the consent of all partners. A limited 
partner shall not have* the fight to substitute -in 
assignee in his place without the written consent of 
the General Partner; however, nothing herein shall 
prohibit the assignment by cjift or bequest by a 
limited partner of all or part of his partnership 
interest in the Partnership to any lineal descendant 
or spouse. 
8. Dissolution. The Partnership shall be dissolved 
upon the occurrence of any of the following events: 
« •«. •• »•£*'. »r 
f lOf AT. WtULtHfc. PAU14CN * BUftNINCMAM 
• I N I'lOOft TKfBUNI aUILDINO 
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(a) The sale of ail Property to third parties, 
(b) The withdrawal, bankruptcy, insolvency, or 
receivership of thr f>n«»r.*i l\iri.nr»r. 
Cc) Upon, written notice by the Mwlt d Partner, 
if the General Partner tin IJ fail to pt.rfc •» its 
obligations hereunder and .inch failure shall continue 
for a period of thirty (10} days after receipt of such 
written notice. 
In the event of a di •;: r»lnt ion ;is provided hereinabove, 
the Partnership Bhnll iimnedi.H #Oy lK»|iti to wind uf» its affairs. 
The proceed* from liquidation o par. n«?rnhip arrets, sfter 
payment to al) croditorn of the Partnership in tin* oider of 
priority provided by law, :;h<ill be paid and applied .n accordance 
with paragraph five (5) hereof. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, tic parties have cxecu ;ed this 
Agreement the day find year firs above written. 
GENERA , PARTNER: 
DIXIE IX CORPORATION 
By. 
LIMITED WWTNKRs 
Vernon B. Cl inton 
I A M ©»r.« %... . * 
WOTTAT. W l kIMC. PAULVCM * BUHNIMCMAM 
IP •Tflr.iOMAt. » u*r»m*t*o* 
14 • UOUTH MAIN Limt i T 
SALT I ARC CITY. U T A H ©4111 
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I.nCAl. DESCRIPTION 
K.XHIU1T "A" 
BEGINNJ *G at the Southwest Quarter cirner of 
Section 22, Township 3 South, Range '. Heat, 
Salt l n e Rn«c and Meridian, running North 
0 # 08* 8* East 2655.44 foot to the *>st 
Quarter corner of Section 22, Township 3 South, 
Range 1 Nest, Salt Lake Base mr\6 Meridian, 
thence forth 89• 57• 01" Eaat 1320 feet; therzm 
South 0* 08' 38" Nest 924 feet; thence North 
89* 57' 01" East 612.7A foot; thence South 
0 # 07' 35" West 80S.03 feet; thence North 
89» 52» 25* West )2.5 feet; thence South 
0# 07* 35* West 584.33 lout; thence Noxth 
89# 51* 22" West 575.70 foot; thence South 
0# 08' 3 1* West 347.?ri ft.i-L; «hf.ncc North 
89# 54' i0" W. r;t 114% ft of to t ho point of 
!**<f1nnin |. 
MOTTAt. W LLINO. pAtll »UM 6 I'WftNIMCMAM 
•TM rwOOM f f t l U N l OUIL «IMT. 
« o SOUTH MAIN cT*n r 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH ;41I1 
As evidence of good faith Idxie Six Corporation herewith tenders a check in the 
aaount of 110,000.00 which wi l l apply to the amount Scheller l a to receive on 
the property. 
CERTIFICATE OF LIMITED PARTNERSHIP 
OF 
D . S. T., LTD. 
Pursuant to the Utah Uniform Limited Partnership Act, 
Dixie Six Corporation, a Utah corporation, hereinafter r«f#rrad* 
to a- "n)vlc\ VIVIAN M. SC»:r.!'rR# a vonan, .and STEVEN D. 
TCLLSTRIP, a man, hereinafter referred to collectively as "the 
Limited Partners", and individually by name, have formed a 
limited partnership and do hereby certify a,nd state: 
ARTICIX I 
NAML 
The name of the limited partnership is 0, S. T., LTD. 
ARTICLE II 
PUR:OSE 
The purpose and character of the business of the 
• tror hip is t subdivide, develop ind market certain real 
property located in Salt Lake County, Utah. 
ARTICLE III 
PRINCIPAL PLACE OF BUSINESS 
The principal office of the partnership shall be at 
4394 South Redwood Road, Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, Utah* 
The partnership may maintain such other offices and placasof 
business as the partners from time to time find necessary or 
desirable, either within or without the State of Utah. 
ARTICLE IV 
NAMES AND RFFIPFNCE OF PARTNERS 
The names and residence addressos of each member of 
the partnership, general and limited partners being specifically 
designated, are as follows: 
GENERAL PARTNER: 
DIXIE SIX CORPORATION * 4394 South Redwood Road 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
LIMITED PARTNERS: 
.VIVIAN M. SCHELLER 3778 East Cliff Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah §4117 
STEVEN D. TCLLSTRUP 
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ARTICLE V 
TERM 
The term of the partnership shall begin as of the tat* 
of the execution of this Partnership Agreement, and shall Oontlnua 
until December 31, 1982, and tK~rcaftcr from year to year UnlosS 
terminated or dissolved at hereinafter provided. 
ARTICLE VI 
CONTRTBUTIONC DY PARTNERS 
The Limited Partners shall sell to the partnership 
the real property more fully described in Exhibit mhm annexed 
hereto and made a part herecf, which has an agreed value ot st* 
THIRTY THOUSAND DOLLARS ($30,000) per acre. Dixie shall con- 5i 
tribute to the partnership the sum of $10,000, which sum shall be 
oai^ to the Limited Partners as a down payment on the property. 
*
n
 Addition thereto, Dixie shall contribute its expertise tor the 
purpose of subdividing, developing and marketing the property) 
shall provide or obtain all equipment, machinery and personnel 
necessary for such subdivision, development and marketing; m a 
shall obtain the necessary and sufficient financing for su^h 
-SubSJvision, development BT>6 marketing, vMinp tb* property ## 
security therefor. 
ARTICLE VII 
ADDITIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS 
The Limited Partners shall not be obligated to ftmks 
Any additional contributions to the partnership. 
ARTICLE VIII 
RETURN OF CONTRIBUTIONS 
8.1. The Limited Partners shall be entitled to 
payment for the property upon termination of the 
partnership as provided in Article V or upon dissolution 
of the partnership as provided herein; provided, 
however, the Limited Partners shall not receive payment 
for the property until (a) all liaoilities of the 
partnership, except liabilities to the General Partner 
and Lir.itcu Partners on account of their contribution* 
have been paa- or there rerams property of the partner-
ship sufficient to pay therr? (b) the consent of all 
partners is had? and (c) the certificate is cancelled 
or so amended as to set forth the withdrawal or 
reduction. 
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8.2. Subject to the limitations of paragraph 8.1, 
the Limited Partners may rightfully demand payment for the 
property (a) on dissolution of the partnership, or (b) on 
the date specified in Article V for termination and 
dissolution of the partnership. 
ARTICLE IX 
PROFITS AND BOOKS 
9.1. The first accounting period for the partnership 
shall be from the date of execution o f this Agreement to 
December 31, 1980. Thereafter, the profits and losses of 
the partnership shall be computed annually for each period 
January 1 through* December 31. Profits and losses shall be 
allocated eoually as specified hercinbelow. 
9.2. Receipts of the partnership shall be allocated 
as follows: 
(a) First, to the actual expenses of the 
partnership or Dixie relativo to the subdividing, 
development, improvement and sale of the property, 
such expenses to be itemized on a monthly statement 
provided to the Lir'ted Partners. 
(b) Second, to payment to the Limited Partners 
for the real property. 
(c) Third, one-half of the remainder to Dixie 
and one-half of the remainder to the Limited Partners. 
9.3. In calculating the actual expenses of the part-
nership or Dixie relative to the subdividing, development, 
improvement and aale of the property pursuant to paragraph 
9.2(a) hereinabove, Dixie shall not apply any fixed cost or 
overhead expenses to the partnership project. Dixie or any 
of its affiliates or principals may charge the partnership 
a real estate brokerage commission not exceeding six percent 
(6%) of the sales price of the property or any portion 
thereof. 
9.4. %:o salary shall be paid to any Partners. There 
will be established an individual drawing account to be 
maintained for each Partner, which shall be charged with ell 
withdrawals %&de for such Partner's benefit. Ho drawing 
account shall be established for the General Partner unless 
and until all actual expenses of development and Improvement 
have been paid and the Limited Partners have received 
payment for the real property. 
9.5. An individual capital account shall be maintained 
for each Partner and shall be credited with all contrib-
utions made by that Partner and charged and credited in 
accordance with this paraqraph and with paragraphs 9.1, 9.6 
and 9.7 herein. 
9.6. As soon as practicable after the close of each 
calendar year, but in no event later than three and one-ha11 
(3-1/2) months after the close of the calendar year, the 
drawing accounts of the Partners shall be closed to the 
capital accounts. 
9.7. After payment of all debts and expenses of the 
partnership, the net cash flow of the partnership may be 
distributed to the Partners annually or more frequently, 
as determined by the General and Limited Partners. For pur-
poses of this paragraph, not cash' flow shall be deemed 
to mean net cash remaining in the partnership's account afte: 
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payment of all legitimate partnership expenses end with-
holding a reasonable reserve for contingencies. Such cash 
flow shall be coirputed without regard to profits or 
losses shown on the partnership's books, except as Such . 
profits or losses may affect the reserve for contingencies, 
Any such distributions shall be charged against the 
Partners' drawing accounts. 
9.8. The books of the partnership shall be *altrained 
at the principal office of the partnership and shall be 
open to reasonable inspection by any partner. Such books 
shall be kept on such accountmq basis as the partnership 
may determine from time to timu, 
ARTICLE X 
ATD3TI0i;\L LIMITED PAPTNERS 
" • • " • " « ' " 
No auuitional limited partners shall be admitted to 
the partnership without the unanimous consent of all partners, 
both aeneral and limited. .w^f £ 0& . 
„/. fa?,?*'- XT ;/" J rs/7 
ARTICLE XII *ir.-*'*' ^V^ 
PRIORITY OF LIMITED PARTNERS 
No Limited Partner shall have priority over any other 
Limited Partner either as to contributions to capital or by way 
of income. 
ARTICLE XIII 
DEMAND OP PROPERTY IN RETUPN FOR CONTRIBUTION 
Upon termination of the partnership, no general or 
limited partner shall have the right to demand and receive prop-
erty other than cash in return for it* contribution. Upon con~ 
~^rr*ncf> of all the partners, both general and limited, other 
than the partner demanding return of his contribution, the 
withdrawing partner may have his contribution returned ih property 
other than casft. 
ARTICLE XIV 
CONDUCT OF PARTNERSHIP 
On the date hereof, the Limited Partners shall convey 
the property cesenbej in Exhibit "A" to the partnership by 
Warranty Deed. The Limited Partners shall cause euch property tc 
be graded to meet Salt Lake County standards, end shall cause ell 
buildings and personal property located on such property to be 
rerroved therefrom. It is understood by the parties that tho 
Property shall be utilized by the partnership to obtain % loan 
the proceeds thereof to be used for the subdivision, AevtimNut 
and marketing ci the property by Dixie. 
MANAGEMFNT 
15.1. Subject to the provisions stated in this 
Article, Dixie shall exercise complete control in the 
management of the partnership and shall devote such tine 
to the partnership as shall bo reasonably required for 
its welfare and success. Dixie shall obtain the necessary 
financing for the subdivision, development and starketing 
of the property. Dixie shall proceed with subdividing, 
developing and marketing the property as expeditiously 
as possible. Dixie shall do no act detrimental to the 
best interests of the partnership. 
15.2. No Limited Partner shall participate in the 
management ^' the partnership business. 
15.3. The Limited Partners hereby consent to any sale 
or other disposition, encumbrance, mortgage or lease by 
Dixie on behalf of the partnership, of any or all of the 
partnership assets, now or horcafter acquired, on such terms 
and conditions as may be determined by Dixie, and to the 
employment, when and if required, of such brokers, agents 
and attorneys as Dixie may determine, notwithstanding that 
any party hereto iray have an interest therein? provided, 
however, in the event Dixie proposes to sell the property to 
any entity controlled by Dixie or in which Dixie or any of 
its principals own an interest, the sale price for the 
property shall be determined as follows: 
Dixie shall appoint an appraiser, the Limited 
Partners shall appoint an appraiser, end the two 
appraisers thus appointed shall appoint a third 
appraiser. The three appraisers thus determined 
shall thereupon appraise the partnership property. 
An appraisal agreed to by at least two of the 
three appraisers shall be controlling. 
ARTICLE XVI 
DFPOriTS 
All funds of the partnership shall be deposited in its 
name in such checking account or accounts designated by Dixie* 
All withdrawals therefrom shall be made upon checks signed by the 
authorized officers of Dixie. 
ARTICLE XVII 
CONVEYANCES 
Any deed, bill of sale, mortgage, lease, contract of 
sale or other document purporting to convey or encumber the inter-
est cf the partnership in all or any portion of any real or person 
property at any time held in its name, may be signed by Dixie. 
ARTICLE XVIII 
DISSOLUTION OF PARTNERSHIP 
Tne partnership shall be dissolved upon the occurrence 
of any of the following events: 
(a) The sale of all property to third parties. 
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(b) The bankruptcy, insolvency, receivership or 
involuntary dissolution of Dixie. 
(c) Upon written notice by the Limited Partners, if 
Dixie shall fail to perform its obligations hereunder and 
such failure shall continue for a period of thirty (H>) 
d y s after "ceeipt of such written notice. 
In the event of a dissolution as.provided hereinabove, 
the partnership shall immediately begin to wind up**lts affairs. 
The proceeds from liquidation of partnership assets, after payment 
to all creditors of the partnership in the.order of priority 
provided by law, shall be paid and applied in accordance with 
Article IX hereinabove. 
ARTICLE XIX 
GOVERNING LAW 
This agreement and the rights of the parties hereunder 
shall be interpreted in accordance with the laws in the State of 
Utah. 
ARTICLE XX 
LIMITED LIABILITY 
The liability of the Limited Partners shall be limited 
to contributions made to the partnership. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned have hereunto 
s e t their hands t h i s f? * day of / V M / f C / / , 1980. 
GENERAL PARTNER! 
DIXIE SIX CORPORATION 
